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Stephen C Thaman *

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN THE
BAlANCE: MODERN EXCLUSIONARY RULES
AND THE TOLERATION OF POLICE
LAWLESSNESS IN THE SEARCH FOR TRUTH

This article explores the tension in modern criminal procedure between the goal of
ascertaining the material truth of the criminal charge and the respect for important
human rights of criminal suspects during the investigation of their alleged criminal
responsibility. It examines two major areas where police run the risk of violating and
often do violate the constitutional right~ of criminal suspects during interrogations
and during invasions of privacy in the form of dwelling searches and interception
of confidential communications. The approaches of modern democracies to this
dilemma run from the strict exclusion of all direct and indirect evidence (fruits of
the poisonous tree), whenever a substantial constitutional right is violated, to a discretionary approach, which balances various factors, including the need to ascertain
the truth before deciding whether to use the evidence. The ambition of the article is to
draw clear lines between when courts should exclude evidence and when discretion
can reign.
Keywords: exclusionary rule/fruits of the poisonous tree/nullities/privacy/
search for truth/ self-incrimination (privilege of)
1

Introduction

The notions of 'truth' and 'evidence' have been inextricably intertwined
in the history of Western criminal procedure since the advent of inquisitorial criminal procedure on the European Continent in the late Middle
Ages. The justice achieved by early customary and lay courts in pre-inquisitorial times often had little to do with either truth or evidence. The only
criminal evidence accepted as being 'true' was the hard facts produced by
the flagrant crime, when 'hand-having' thieves or 'red-handed' assailants
were caught in the act and either summarily killed or hurriedly sentenced
to death by ad hoc courts. Mediation conducted by respected community
figures or elders and restoring the peace between victim (or victim's
family or clan) and culprit took priority over the meticulous determination of 'what happened' in the era of duels, swearing contests among
compurgators, and divine ordeals. There was little truth in these procedures but also little punishment because punishment triggered
anger, feud, and blood revenge. Co~ppensation to the victim was the
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rule, if the suspect was not finished off fragrantly. Even when juries or
SchOJ!engerichte replaced these primitive procedures, their roles had
more to do with appraising whether the accused should be accepted
back into the community and on what terms than with evidence analysis
and truth determination.'
It was with the 'scientization' of criminal procedure and the displacement of lay judges and irrational procedures by professional judges with
their 'truth-seeking' inquisitorial powers of evidence gathering and preservation that the link between 'evidence' and 'truth' was soldered and
took priority over the more humane concern of smoothing over the conflict the wrongful act had caused in the community. The growing ascendency of inquisitorial procedure was dictated by the needs of the central
powers of church and state which sought to subjugate local governments
and their systems of dispute-resolution. The 'truths' the governments
sought to prove through their courts were often self-perpetuating myths
or fictions upon which the central powers' domination rested; the
crimes which arguably gave rise to this system were crimes against tl1e
state or religion that could not be proved adequately by mere witnesses
or victims (there were none): they had to be proved by judges learned
in the science of the law, acting secretly without being nettled by
victims, accuseds, lawyers, or the public. 3
But the dominance of inquisitorial procedure on the European continent did not, despite advances in evidence taking and greater predictability of professional decision making, mean a humanizing of the resolution
of criminal disputes. Enlightenment thinkers complained that more
terror and inhumanity were perpetrated by the administration of the
law in these times than were committed by common criminals.' More
innocent persons were convicted and sentenced to death in this era

l See in general Stephen C Thaman, 'A Typology of Consensual Criminal Procedures: An
Historical and Comparative Perspective on the Theory and Practice of Avoiding the Full
Criminal Trial' in Stephen C Thaman, ed, World Plea Bargaining (Durham, NC:
Carolina Academic Press, 2010) 297 [Thaman, 'Typology'].
2 The 'right solution' was based on 'textual analysis and logical penetration of its
meaning.' Law 'came increasingly to be regarded as a self-contained, or closed
system - a 'science'; Mirjan R Damaska, The Faces ofJustice and State Autharity (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1986) at 31. This science 'needed no illumination'
because it was a science of text; Niklas Luhmann, Das Recht der Gesellschaft
(Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1995) at 48.
3 On how the secret, victimless crime of heresy required a new procedure, see Richard
Vogler, A Wm-ld View uf Criminal Justice (Burlington, VT: Ashg-ate, 2005) at 25. The
procedure in ecclesiastical courts for heresy and magic was the most 'ferocious' and
required the forced cooperation_ of the accused; see Luigi Ferrajoli, Diritto e ragione:
tearia del garantismo penale, 5th ed (Rome: Laterza.1998) at 577 [Ferrajoli].
4 Ferrajoli, ibid at 339, 382. On criminal procedure of this epoch as a 'science of
horrors,' see ibid at 578.
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than in any other era of European history, often based on confessions
extorted through legalized torture or the threat thereof."
Although torture was officially abolished in Europe by the end of the
eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth centuries, 6 continental
Europe experienced political convulsions throwing most countries back
and forth between the extremes of absolute-monarchist police state and
liberalism during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. All pretences of a state under the rule of law, of course, were erased with the
rise of Bolshevism in Russia, Nazism in Germany, Fascism in Italy, and
Francoism in Spain.
It was in reaction to the horrors of the holocaust and Soviet totalitarianism that the human rights movement was launched after 1945, resulting in the promulgation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR) / the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) ,8 and
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) .9 The
American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) followed in 1969. 10
Mter emerging from Fascist domination after World War II, Germany
and Italy enacted new constitutions which reflected the priority given
to the protection of citizens against the threat of violence and arbitrariness by the state. Spain followed in 1978. A similar explosion of new constitutions and criminal-procedure reforms occurred in the 1990s as Latin
America emerged from decades of authoritarian military regimes and the
collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia gave rise to a host of new
aspiring democracies in Eastern and South Eastern Europe. It is still
too early to predict whether the domino effect of the so-called 'Arab
Spring,' which as of this writing has resulted in the toppling of repressive

5 On the conviction of the innocent, Cesare Beccaria, Dei Delitti e Dell£ Pene, 4th ed
(Milan: Feltrinelli, 1995) at 62. Jean de Ia Bruyere, 'De quelques usage' in Les
Caracteres, says, 'Torture is a wonderful invention and may be counted upon to ruin
an innocent person with a weak constitution and exonerate a guilty person born
robust'; and further, 'I might almost say in regard to myself, 'I will not be a thief or
a murderer'; but to say, 'I shall not someday be punished as such,' would be to
speak very boldly'; cited in Adhemar Esmein, History of Continental Criminal Procedure,
with Special Reference to France, translated by .John Simpson (Boston: Little, Brown,
1913) at 352, 380.
6 John H Langbein, Torture and the Lnw of Proof Europe and England in the Ancien Rigime
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977) at 10.
7 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217A (III), UNGAOR, 3d Sess, Supp No
13, UN Doc A/810 (1948) at 71 [UDHR).
8 ('.lmvention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 November 1950,
213 UNTS 221, Eur TS 5 [ECHR).
9 International Convenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171,
6 ILM 368 (1967) [ICCP).
10 American Convention on Human Rights, 21 November 1969, 1144 UNTS 143, 9 ILM 99
(1969) [ACHR).
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dictatorships in Tunisia and Egypt, will extend further and actually lead to
a similar democratization and respect for the rule of law.
The experience in common-law countries has been a bit different.
England had no experience of Fascism and, due to its unique tradition,
no written constitution or Bill of Rights listing specific protections for
its citizens. Police lawlessness, where it existed, did not, generally, affect
the admission of evidence in the common-law tradition. In Britain, the
courts did not worry about the methods used to acquire evidence if it
was otherwise relevant and material. 11
The United States, on the other hand, had its Bill of Rights of 1791,
the purpose of which was to restrict the new federal government from
passing any laws which would affect the freedoms of the citizens of the
thirteen states which made up the new Union at that time. In the early
days, however, nearly all criminal cases in the United States were
handled in the state courts, goven1ed by state laws and constitutions.
Until the end of the Civil War in 1865, African-American slaves had few
rights under the laws of the states or the federal government. The enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment to the US Constitution in 1865
granted the freed slaves 'due process of law' in relation to the states,
yet it was only in the 1930s that the US Supreme Court (USSC) began
overturning state criminal convictions based on torture and rejecting
the use of other coercive tactics which undermine the freedom of will
of the accused as 'violations of due process.' 12
Already in 1914 the USSC adopted an exclusionary rule which prevented the use of evidence seized by Federal officials in violation of the
Fourth Arnendment. 13 The problems this rule addressed were made abundantly clear:
The tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of the country to obtain
conviction by means of unlawful seizures and enforced confessions, the latter
often obtained after subjecting accused persons to unwarranted practices
destructive of rights secured by the Federal Constitution, should find no sanction
in the judgments of the courts which are charged at all times with the support of

11 Peter Murphy & Eric Stockdale, cds, Blackstone's Criminal Practice, 13th ed (London,
Blackstone Press, 2003) at 1974.
12 The most notorious of the dozens of cases decided in this area was Bwwn v Mississippi,
297 US 278 ( 1936) , which involved the torture of Black suspects in a murder case and
their hurried sentence to death three days later in a kangaroo jury court.
13 The Fourth Amendment of the US Constitution reads, 'The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unrea~onahle searches and
seizures shall not be violated, and no Warr.mts shall issue but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.'
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the Constitution and to which people of all conditions have a right to appeal for
the maintenance of such fundamental rights.' 4

The USSC only became a true constitutional court for the entire
country, however, when, influenced by the civil rights movement in the
1950s and 1960s, it decided that the Fourth, Fifth 15 and Sixth
Arnendments' 6 to the US Constitution, were binding on the states, thus
enabling it to affect racist practices in many, mainly Southern, states
which deprived Mrican-American citizens of the protection of the law
in criminal cases.
The notion that evidence obtained as a result of police violation of the
constitution could not be used in a criminal .trial was finally established
nationwide and made applicable to the states during the years that Earl
Warren was Chief Justice. ' 7 The landmark decisions in this respect were
(1) Mapp v Ohio," which made the Fourth Amendment exclusionary
rule of R-eeks binding on the States; (2) Wong Sun v United States/ 9
which re-articulated the exclusionary rule in relation to derivative evidence causally linked to preceding constitutional violations; 20 (3)
Massiah v United States/' which provided for exclusion of statements
made to government agents by charged defendants, in violation of the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel; and, of course ( 4) Miranda v
Arizona,22 which provided for exclusion of confessions and admissions
made during custodial interrogation where the suspect was not advised
of the right to silence and the right to counsel or did not effectively
waive those rights, in violation of the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination.
These landmark decisions, especially Mapp and Miranda, have been
very influential overseas, but so have some of the limitations placed on
the exclusionary rule by the USSC under Chief Justice Warren Burger,23
foremost of these being the exceptions to the doctrine of the 'fruits of

14 l#eks v United States, 232 US 383 at 392 (1911) [Weeks].
15 US Const amend V provides inter alia that '[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself.'
16 US Const amend VI, inter alia: 'In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defense.'
17 From 1953 to 1969.
18 Mapp v Ohio, 367 US fi43 (1961) [Mapp].
19 Wong Sun v United States, 371 US 471 (1963).
20 The term 'fruit of the poisonous tree' was originally coined by Justice Frankfurter in
Nardone v United States, 308 US 338 (1939), but the idea that the government could
not use derivative evidence was articulated nineteen years earlier by Justice Holmes
in Silverthorne Lumber Co v United States, 251 US 385 (1920) [Silverthorne].
21 Massiah v United States, 377 US 201 (1964).
22 Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966) [Miranda].
23 Warren Burger was Chief Justice of the USSC from 1969 to 1986.
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the poisonous tree' known as 'inevitable discovery' 24 and 'independent
source' 25 and the 'good faith' exception to violations of the Fourth
Amendment. 26
Long before the innovations of the Warren Court, inquisitorial systems on
the European continent had developed rules to address violations of the law
by organs oflaw enforcement at a time when common-law courts never questioned the provenance of the evidence before them. Continental European
codes of criminal procedure prescribed rather strict rules for the gathering
of evidence and the performance of other acts during the preliminary criminal investigation and provided for the nullification of the efficacy of these
acts if they were performed in violation of the statutory rules. So-called 'nullities' could and did lead to exclusion of evidence. 27 In fact, one ofthe most
influential treatises on exclusionary rules was written in Germany before the
USSC's decision in ft.eekf8 and is one of the first scholarly attempts to create a
balancing test for the introduction of illegally gathered evidence.
The thesis of this article is that, while all lawmakers and courts 'balance'that is, make value judgment<; - when navigating between the Scylla of fundamental or constitutional rights and the Charybdis of truth and accuracy in
criminal trials, some kinds of official law violations are so serious that they
should trigger a very strong presumption of non-use of the evidence resulting therefrom. True 'balancing' of various considerations should occur only
where the violation is not properly characterized as fundamental.
The value judgment that a violation is fundamental is sometimes made at
the level of international law, such as with the prohibition of torture, sometimes in constitutions and codes, and sometimes by the courts. The prevailing
view is that the violations must be 'serious'; that is, must be of fundamental or
constitutional rights. Even if a constitutional violation has been identified
which could trigger exclusion or 'non-use' of evidence, judges must again
decide whether the evidence the prosecution seeks to use is actually the
'fruit of the poisonous tree'; that is, does it derive inexorably from the constitutional violation? And finally, even if it is agreed that a constitutional right has
been violated and the evidence sought to be admitted is the fruit thereof,
some jurisdictions still require the judge to engage in a balancing of other
important interests before deciding on admissibility, for instance: ( 1) the
24 First articulated in Nix v Williams, 467 US 431 at 444-50 (1984) [Williams].
25 First articulated in Silverthorne, supra note 20 at 392 but then reaffirmed in Murray v
United States, 487 US 533 at 537-9 (1988) [Murray].
26 United States v Leon, 468 US 897 at 918-25 (1984) [Leon].
27 On how inquisitorial Europe developed 'extrinsic' exclusionary rules relating to 'values
unrelated to the pursuit of truth' at a time when the common law only knew 'intrinsic'
rules relating to the probative value of evidence, see Miljan R Damaska, Evidence La:w
Adrift (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997) at 12-7.
28 Emst Beling, Die Beweisvemote als Grenz.en der Wahrheitserfurschung im Strafprozess (Breslau,
Germany: Schletter'sche Buchhandlung, 1903) [Beling].
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seriousness of the constitutional violation (was it intentional, reckless, negligent, etc), (2) the gravity of the crime which is before the court, (3) the character of the evidence subject to exclusion (its credibility, importance for
proving guilt, whether it constitutes the corpus delicti of the crime or is
'mere evidence,' etc), (4) whether use of the evidence would violate the
defendant's right to a fair trial, and other factors.
While courts will inevitably engage in balancing, I do not think that
determining the material truth in a criminal proceeding should be considered to be a higher goal than respect for the international and constitutional protection of the right to human dignity and related guarantees
respecting the right to silence and privacy. But the principle of material
truth, which I believe nowhere has constitutional status, still holds sway in
the criminal courts. Yet, a legal system which takes advantage of explicit
loopholes or vague balancing principles in order to use evidence gathered directly or indirectly by means of unconstitutional acts of its investigative organs only with difficulty incorporates the spirit of a state under
the rule of law. As long as such loopholes exist, constitutional rights
will be routinely violated by state officials.
A dismissal or acquittal in a criminal proceeding violates no fundamental human rights, even when the evidence seems to point to the
guilt of the accused. The victim of an act of violence or theft remains a
victim, whether or not the defendant is convicted. In the case of victimless drug crimes, which constitute the overwhelming majority of cases
involving illegal searches and a large number of those with illegal wiretaps, a dismissal does not prevent future surveillance and legal apprehension of what are usually repeat offenders involved in an illegal enterprise.
In the United States, the power in the hands of law enforcement is
awesome. Life impri~onment is possible for first-time drug dealers'" and
recidivist thieves. 30 Around 751 of every 100,000 residents of the United
States are behind bars." The coercive nature of the plea-bargaining
system means that no more than 5 per cent of those convicted actually
have a trial that results in an ascertainment of 'the truth' based on the
full panoply of 'due process' rights. 32 A healthy scepticism if not mistrust
of the powers of the state, even in a modern democracy, may still be warranted and the warnings of the authors of the Weeks and subsequent
decisions should not be dismissed as being antiquated. 33
29 Harmelin v Michigan, 501 US 957 (1991).
30 Ewing v California, 538 US 11 (2003); !1Jrkye:r v Andrade, 538 US 63 (2003).
31 Adam Liptak, 'Inmate Count in US Dwarfs Other :"Jations' New Yom Times (23 April
2008) AI.
32 Thaman, 'Typology,' supra note 1 at 327-8.
33 I disagree with the majority of the USSC when they intimate that improved police
training, discipline regimes, and the possibility of civil suits (which were not available
when Mapp, supra note 18 was decided) might make the exclusionary rule no
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In order to provide an effective remedy for violations of rights in criminal investigations, evidence obtained in violation of fundamental constitutional rights should presumptively be excluded, su~ject only to
narrowly drawn exceptions for good-faith errors and emergencies.
Exclusion of such evidence ~hould not depend on the balancing of interests; otherwise, fundamental human rights will be lost in the balance. But
evidence obtained through unlawful state conduct that does not rise to
the level of violating a fundamental constitutional right may properly
be considered for admission on the basis of a balancing test. To illustrate
this distinction, I will concentrate on violations of two of the most important constitutional protections; that is, (1) where police violate the constitution in acquiring confessions, and (2) where they violate the
constitution by invading the privacy of one's home or private conversations."• I will analyse the constitutional, statutory, and court-made doctrine dealing with seemingly absolute exclusionary rules in comparative
and international law, which brook of no balancing (or are 'pre-balanced'
by the law-giver), and relative exclusionary rules, which encourage balancing of various interests, and will explore how these absolute and relative
exclusionary rules deal with the use of derivative evidence or 'fruits of the
poisonous tree.' Before beginning my analysis of the various approaches,
however, I will briefly discuss the concept of 'nullities' as it developed in
civil-law jurisdictions and try to flush out how 'nullities,' in the abstract,
differ from modern exclusionary rules. The workings of concrete 'nullities' and exclusionary rules will then be addressed in the succeeding
parts of the article.

n 'Nullities' in modern criminal procedure codes

Many countries in Europe and Latin America still provide for 'nullities'
when there is a violation of procedural norms. In some countries, such
as France, procedural 'nullities' are still the only statutory grounds for
excluding evidence. In others, such as Italy, Spain, Brazil, or Colombia,

longer valid. Hudson v Michigan, 547 US 586 at 597-9 (2006) [Hudson]. The economic
crisis has caused drastic cuts in the budgets of police departments (as well as public
defender offices) which could lead to an actual decline in the quality of justice
delivered on both the investigative and the adjudicative ends of criminal
proceedings in the United States. And violations of constitutional rights, such as
failure to get a search warrant, are often just cost-cutting and time-saving measures
not linked to any true exigent circumstance.
34 I will be largely ignoring another substantial area of exclusionary doctrine in the
United States relating to statements and physical evidence gathered as fruits of
unlawful detentions or arrests.
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the code has maintained the doctrine of 'nullities' and yet added modem
statutory or even constitutional prohibitions on the use of illegally gathered evidence.
The relationship between modem rules of exclusion or 'non-usability'
( inutilizzabilitii, to use the Italian term), which were often inspired by the
American case law of the last fifty years, and the more venerable 'nullities,' which originally related to procedural acts and not necessarily to
the evidence these acts might have produced, is often difficult (at least
for a lawyer schooled in the common law!) to understand. For instance,
one category of nullities, called 'nullities of general order' relates to
defects in the procedure which do not necessarily touch on the collection
of evidence, but are treated as grave violations which can even lead to dismissal of the prosecution. 35
Section 171 of CCP-France provides, 'There is a nullity when a failure
to recognize a substantial formality contained in a provision of the
present Code or any other provision of criminal procedure has infringed
on the interests of the party to which it applies. ' 36 This formulation
appears close to limiting France's nullity-based exclusionary rule to constitutional violations, at least when the 'party to which it applies' is the
defendant. Section 174(3) further provides that the annulled act will
be removed from the case dossier. In civil-law systems, the withdrawal of
the document memorializing an investigative measure from the dossier
traditionally meant that no use could be made of it or its contents at
the trial. 37 Since the document is excluded before the case reaches the
trial court, the trial judge will be as insulated from the tainted evidence

35 See Codice di Procedura Penale, § 178 (entered into force 22 October 1989) [CCP-Italy].
On 'general order' nullities in France, see Richard Frase, 'France,' in Craig M Bradley,
ed, Criminal Procedurr: A Worldwide Study, 2d ed (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press,
2007) 213 [Fra~e].
36 Code de Procidurr Penale [CCP-France]. C6digo de Processo Penal§ 563 [CCP·Brazil] also
limits nullities to violations which infringe on the interests of the prosecution or the
defence; § 566 to violations which affect the ascertainment of the truth or the
outcome of the trial. Spain's Organic Law on the Judicial Power provides for a
'nullity' when: 'the essential rules of procedure are not respected and this may have
caused an actual restriction of defense rights'; Ley Organica (LO) 6/1985, 1 July, Del
Poder Judicial Y Del Ejercicio Potestad Jurisdiccional, § 238, online: <http://noticias.
juridicas.com/base_datos/Admin/lofi.1985.html> [LOPJ-Spain].
37 In systems where the written trial still dominates, such as in the Netherlands or the
French trial in the correctional courts, the documents in the dossier could
historically be read at the trial. This is now changing because the European Court of
Human Rights (ECtHR) has held that the use of written statements may violate
ECHR, suprd note 8, art 6(3)(d), which guarantees the right to confrontation. See
inter alia, Delta v France (1993), 16 EHRR 574 and discussion in Stephen C Thaman,
Comparative Criminal Procedurr: A Casebook Approach, 2d ed (Durham, NC: Carolina
Academic Press, 2008) at 125-35 [Thaman, Criminal Procedurr].
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as would be a jury in the United States following a successful pre-trial
motion to exclude evidence.
The CCP-Italy distinguishes between 'relative nullities,' which must be
raised by the parties and if recognized may be 'sanitized' or cured by
waiver by the affected party or by the official who violated the law,'8
and 'absolute nullities,' which are usually of constitutional importance,
may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, may not be 'sanitized,'
and may lead to exclusion of evidence. 39
Some nullity provisions also explicitly refer to derivative evidence.
Thus, according to CCP-France, '[T] he 'annulled acts or documents
are withdrawn from the investigative dossier' and it is 'prohibited to
derive any information against the parties from the annulled act<; or
documents.' 40 CCP-Italy also provides that ' [ t] he nullity of an act
renders the subsequent acts invalid which depend on that declared to
be annulled.' 41
In Italy, the term 'nullity' usually refers to acts, whereas the term 'nonusability' refers to evidence.•~ 'Non-usability' has been limited in the literature to cases where there is a statutory prohibition on the gathering
of the evidence, whereas 'nullities' arise when legal formalities are violated in the gathering of what would otherwise be admissible evidence.
The courts, however, have used the term 'non-usability' to apply both
to both types of illegalities, creating a doctrinal murkiness. In 2001, the
Italian Constitutional Court made it clear that the 'fruits of the poisonous
tree' applies only to 'nullities' when expressly provided by statute,
whereas CCP-Italy section 191, providing for 'non-usability,' has no
language referring to derivative evidence!3
CCP-Netherlands, which appears to be an adaptation of traditional
nullity rules and applies to any 'procedural rule' gives the court discretion

3R C:C:P-Italy, supra note 35, §§ 183-4. For similar provisions, see COdigo Procesal Penal
Argentino§ 171 [CCP-Argentina·Federal]; COdigo Organico Processal Penal§§ 191 at 195
[CCP-Venezuelaj.
39 CCP-Italy, ibid § 179.
40 CPT-France, supra note 36, § 174 al para 3. French courts have based exclusion of
'fruits' on these sections. Jean Pradel, Procedure penale, 9th cd (Paris: Cujas, 1997) at
604-5 [Pradel].
41 Supra note 35§ 185(1). For similar language, see CCP-Brazil, supra note 36, § 573(1);
CCP-Argentina-Federal, supra note 38, § 172; CCP-Venezuela, supra note 38 §§ 196 at
para l.
42 CCP·Italy, supra note 35, § 191. See Paolo Tonini, Manuale di Procedura Penale, 6th ed
(Milan: Giuffre Editore, 2005) at 175.
43 Italian Constitutional Court (24 September 2001), Decision No 332/2001, online:
<http://www.giurcost.org/decisioni/2001/0332o-Ol.html> [Decision No 332/2001];
c.f Giovanni Canso & Vittorio Grevi, Commentario Breve al Nuovo Codice di Procedura
Penale, 4th ed (Padua: CEDAM, 2002) at 339 [Conso & Grevi].
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to exclude evidence or impose other sanctions such as barring prosecu:
tion or mitigating sentence and obligates it to 'take account of the interest that the breached rule serves, the gravity of the breach and the harm it
causes.'••
III

Categorical 'pre-balanced' exclusionary rules

A A CATEGORICAL EXCLUSIONARY RULE TN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE CASE
OF TORTURE AND OF CRUEL, INHUMAN, AND DEGRADING TREATMENT

Although international and regional human rights conventions firmly
protect the privilege against self-incrimination 45 and the right to
privacy, 46 they do not categorically prescribe exclusion of evidence
which is gathered as a direct or indirect result of the violations of these
provisions. Indeed, the treaty language it:.o;;elf indicates that the right to
privacy is not absolute. It may be violated, according to ECHR article
8(2), 'in accordance with the law' and when 'necessary in a democratic
society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic
well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the
protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights or freedoms of others. '•7
The prohibition against torture or other cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment, however, is treated as absolute. There is no qualifYing
language in the treaty texts,'8 and states may not derogate from this protection, even in times of war or public emergency!9 Although the human
rights treaties do not have built-in exclusionary rules, of the Convention
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
(CAT) to which 146 nations are a party,50 clearly prohibits the use of statements gathered through torture. But, oddly enough, the CAT does not
provide an explicit exclusionary rule for statements gathered through
44 l%tboek van Strafuardering § 359a [CCP-Netherlands].
45 ICCP, supra note 9, art 14(3)(g); ACHR, supra note 10, art 8(2)(g). The ECHR
recognized the right to silence as being part of the right to a fair trial guaranteed
under art 6(1); see ECHR]ohn Murray v The United Kingdom, [1996] 3, (1996), 22
EHRR 29 at 60.
46 UDHR, supra note 7, art 12; ICCP, ibid, art 17(1); ECHR, supra note 8, art 8(1); ACHR,
supra note 10, art 11 (2).
47 ECHR, ibid, art 8(2). UDHR, ibid, art 12 prohibits 'arbitrary' interference; ICCP, ibid,
art 17 (1) prohibits 'arbitrary and unlawful' interference; and ACHR, ibid, art 11 (2),
prohibits 'arbitrary and abusive' interference.
48 UDHR, ibid, art 5; ICCP, ibid, art 7; ECHR, supra note 8, art 3; ACHR, ibid, art 5(2).
49 ICCP, ibid, art 4(2); ECHR, supra note 8, art 15(3).
50 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel Inhumane ar Degrading Treatment ar Punishment, GA
Res 39/46, UNGAOR, 39th Sess, Supp No 51, UN Doc A/39/51 (1984) § 15, online:
<http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=UNTSONUNE&tabid~2&mtdsg_no~
N-9&chapter-4&lan~n#Participants

>.
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use of 'cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment."' The UN's 'Body of
Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of
Detention or Imprisonment,' however, requires prosecutors to refuse to
use as evidence statements obtained by torture 'or other ill treatment
except in proceedings against those who are accused of using such
means.' 52 The Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human
Rights (ECtHR) also clearly held in the case of Giifgen v Germany that
the use of any statements gathered through torture or inhuman or
degrading treatment would result in an unfair trial in violation of
ECHR article 6.-'"
Although CAT does not mention exclusion of the 'fruits of the poisonous tree' derived from confessions under torture, it is presumed that the
use of physical or other evidence derived from torture would also violate
the treaty and international law. The ECtHR held in Giifgen that use of
fruits of a tortured confession would automatically result in the violation
of the right to a fair trial, though it admitted that its case law was not as
categorical when it came to the fruits of 'inhuman or degrading' treatment, also prohibited categorically by ECHR article 3. 54
In Giifgen, police threatened a Frankfurt law student with torture and
brutality if he did not reveal the whereabouts of a child kidnap victim,
who they thought was still alive. He made incriminating statements and
took them to the lake where he had disposed of the child's body. A
report of the autopsy conducted on the boy's body and evidence of the
tire tracks of def~ndant's car ncar the lake were used at trial, though
all his statements were suppressed. 55 The ECHR Grand Chamber
deemed that the threats constituted 'inhuman and degrading' treatment
and were thus in violation ofECHR article 3 but did not rise to torture. It
also found that, in such a case, the use of the fruits would not violate the
ECHR right to a fair trial,"" using a kind of 'harmless error' analysis. Since
51 Michael P Scharf, 'Tainted Provenance: When, If Ever, Should Torture Evidence Be
Admissible?' (2008) 65 Wash & Lee L Rev 129 at 140.
52 Ibid at 145.
53 Gafgen v Germany (2011), .~2 EHRR 1 at42, para 166 [Gafgen]. It appears here that the
ECtHR is treating the use of statements at trial, which were obtained as a result of the
violation of ECHR, supra note 8, art 3, as absolute reversible error, not subject to any
'harmless error' analysis. US Courts would likely apply the doctrine of 'harmless
constitutional error' to such a situation, for so-called 'structural errors,' which
constitute automatic reversible errors, are usually not related to the erroneous
admission of evidence, and thus are much like 'nullities of general order' in civil-law
systems; see note 37 supra and accompanying text. On structural and harmless
constitutional error in the United States, see Wayne R LaFave et a!, Criminal
Procedure, 5th ed (St. Paul: West, 2009) at 1323-31 [LaFave eta!].
54 Gafgen, supra: note 53 at 42, paras 166-7.
55 Ibid at 6-7; 9-10, paras 15-8; 29-31.
56 ECHR, supra note 8, art 6.
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the defendant confessed his guilt at trial, the court found that his courtroom testimony was no longer the fruit of the article 3 violation since he
was represented by counsel, and the court based its guilty judgment on
the courtroom confession alone, only using the 'ill-gotten fruits' to corroborate its truthfulness."
Despite the fact that the ECtHR in Gii[!!;en recognized certain exceptions
to an absolute exclusionary rule for fruits of inhuman and degrading
interrogation practices not amounting to torture, such as 'harmless error,'
'inevitable discovery,''" and attenuation of the taint of the illegality, it also
expressly disallows any 'balancing' of this 'absolute' violation against other
interests, such as the 'the seriousness of the offence under investigation or
the public interest in effective criminal prosecution,' 59 which are at the
core of Germany's balancing test, which will be discussed below.
Long before the adoption of the CAT, national legal systems provided for
categorical exclusion of statements obtained by threats, force, deception,
promises, or other means, such as to render them 'involuntary,' which
might fall short of cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment or torture.
Thus, CCP-Germanf" prohibits the use of 'maltreatment, fatigue, physical
intervention, the administration of substances, torture, deception, hypnosis,
threats to apply measures not applicable according to the rules, or promises
of a benefit not provided by law' during questioning and provides for a mandatory exclusionary rule if the prohibitions are violated. 61
In 1897, the USSC held that, for statements taken in police custodial
interrogation to be admissible under the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination, they must 'not be extracted by any sort of
threats or violence, nor obtained by any direct or implied promises,
however slight, nor by the exertion of any improper influence.' 62
Between 1936 to 1966, the USSC also condemned interrogation practices
ranging from clear torture to lesser modes of coercion, threats, promises,
deception, and so forth which might or might not today rise to the level
of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, as violations of 'due process'
and required reversals of thirty-five convictions based thereon."' I will
discuss exclusionary rules dealing with 'involuntary' confessions which
were induced by practices which do not rise to the level of torture or
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, below.
Gafgen, supra note 53 at 44-6, paras 177-83.
Ibid at 44, para 174.
Ibid at para 175-6.
Strafprvzessordnung !§ 136a [ CCP-Germany ].
Similar rules are common in other modern codes of criminal procedure as well; c.f
CPP-Italy, supra note 35 § 64(3) and Ugolovno-protsessual'nyy kodeks Rnssiyskoy Federatsii
(2001) § 9 [CCP-Russia].
62 Bram v United States, 168 US 532 at 542 (1897).
63 For a summary of these 'voluntariness' cases, see LaFave et al, supra note 53 at 343-9.
57
58
59
60
61
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B CATEGORICAL GENERAL EXCLUSIONARY RULES APPLYING TO VIOLATIONS
OF CONSTITUTIONAL AND SUB-CONSTITUTIONAL STATUTORY LAW

A number of constitutions adopted by democratizing countries emerging
from the clutches of totalitarian, authoritarian, or dictatorial regimes
specifically require the exclusion of illegally gathered evidence. This is
an important step, because some courts that require suppression of evidence following a constitutional violation do not acknowledge that the
exclusionary rule itself is of constitutional stature. 64
Some of these exclusionary provisions apply to evidence gathered in violation of statutory provisions which do not rise to violations of fundamental
or constitutional rights. For instance, the 1993 Russian Constitution65 provides, 'In the administration ofjustice the use of evidence gathered in violation of federal law is not permitted. ' 66 Similarly, article 5 (LVI) of the Brazilian
Constitution67 provides for inadmissibility of evidence obtained by 'illegal
means. ' 68 Here, the constitutional legislator has already balanced, or to
put it another way, has pre-empted all balancing by law giv.ers or lowercourt judges. In Russia, the extension of the provisions to errors of non-constitutional gravity has been criticized. 59
There are equally broad-sounding exclusionary rules in some of the
new codes of criminal procedure. CCP-Italy (1988) provides for a sanction of 'non-usability' in relation to 'evidence acquired in violation of prohibitions established by the law.' 7° CCP-Serbia (2006) goes even further:

64 I am, of course, referring to the convoluted attempts by the USSC to characterize
Mapp's, supra note 18, Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule and Miranda's, supra
note 22, Fifth Amendment exclusionary rule (Miranda rule) as 'prophylactic' rules
not required by the constitutional amendments they were originally designed to
safeguard. See Leon, supra note 26 at 897, in relation to the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule and, most recently, United States v Patane, 542 US 630 at 631 (2004)
[Patane], in relation to the Miranda rule.
65 Konstitutsiia Rossiyskoy Federatsii art 50(2) [Const. Russia].
66 For similar language, see Constitution of the Republic of Geurgia (1995) art 42(7) [CanstGeorgia]; Constitution of the Republic of Azerbaijan ( 1995) art 71 (3) [Const-Azerbaijan];
Constitution of the Republic of Belarus art 27(2); Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan
(1995) art 77(3)(9) [Const-Kazakhstan]. CCP-Russia, supra note 61, § 75(1), includes
the same broad exclusionary mandate, as does Ugolavno-prvtsessual'nyy Kodeks
Respubliki Belarus § 105(4)-(5) [CCP-Belarus]; Ugolovno-prvtsessual'nyy Zakon
Respublika kazakhstan § 116 (4) [CCP-Kazakhstan]; Ugolovno-prvtsessual'nyy Kodeks
Kyrgyzskoy Respubliki § 6(3) [CCP-Kyrgyzstan]; Ugolavno-prvtsessual'nyy kodeks
Turkmenistana § 125(4) [CCP-Turkmenistan].
67 Constitution of Brazil (1988) [Const-Brazil].
68 C.f Constitution of the Republic ofTurlrcy (1982) § 38 at para 8 [Const-Turkey] and Turkish
Criminal Procedure Code§ 206(a) (2) [CCP-Turkey), which use similar language.
69 See Stephen C Thaman, 'The Resurrection of Trial by Jury in Russia' (1995) 31 Stan]
lnt'l L 61 at 90-4, discussing exclusionary practices and criticism of the broad rule in
jury trials in 1993-4.
70 CCP-Italy, supra note 35, § 191.
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Court decisions may not be based on evidence which per se, or by method of collection is contrary to the provisions of the present Code, any other law, or has
been collected or presented by virtue of violating human rights and fundamental
freedoms envisaged by the Constitution or ratified international treaties. 71

Occasionally these broad exclusionary rules will even extend to derivative
evidence; that is, to 'fruits of the poisonous tree.' Thus,§ 83 CCP-Slovenia
(1994) provides that a court may not base a decision on evidence
acquired in violation of constitutional rights and liberties, nor of other
explicit norms of criminal procedure, nor on evidence derived from
such violations. 72
These broad rules seem to hearken back to equally broad 'nullity' provisions which are rooted in a strict legality principle according to which
any law violation nullifies the validity of the acts which are the results
thereof. We will see, however, that the blind eye exercised by courts in
relation to the admissibility of otherwise relevant evidence seized in violation of statutory 'nullities' in traditional civil-law regimes also lacks acuity
when it comes to interpreting modern exclusionary rules. 73

C CATEGORICAL GENERAL EXCLUSIONARY RULES RESTRICTED TO
VIOLATIONS OF FUNDAMENTAL OR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

. I believe the better approach is to limit categorical exclusionary rules to
situations where fundamental or constitutional rights are violated. 74 A
statute which I believe could be a model for other jurisdictions and
that expressly extends to the 'fruits of the poisonous tree' is LOPJSpain, which provides, 'Evidence obtained, directly or indirectly in violation of fundamental rights and liberties is without effect. ' 75 In a similar
manner, CCP-Colombia provides for exclusion of' [a] II evidence obtained
in violation of fundamental guarantees' and extends the prohibition to
' [e] vidence which is the consequence of the excluded evidence, or can
only be explained by reason of its existence.' 76
7l Criminal Procedure Code § 15 [CCP-Serbia]. For a US statutory exclusionary rule
extending to non-constitutional statutory violations, see Vernon's Ann Texas CCP art
38.23.
72 Criminal Procedure Act (2007) [CCP-Slovenia] § 83 [CCP-Slovenia]; see Zvonka Fiser
et a!, La legislazione processuale penale della Repubblica di Slavenia, in Berislav Pavisi<': &
Davide Bertaccini, eds, Le altre procedure penali: Transizioni dei sistemi processuali penali,
vol 1 (Turin, Italy: G Giappichelli, 2002).
73 The interpretation ofCCP-ltaly, supr.i note 35, § 191, is a good case in point. See Part
E.ii.b.2 below.
74 C.f 4 Or Rev Stat § 136.4320, which limits exclusion of evidence to situations when
required by the constitutions of Oregon or the United States.
75 Supra note 36, § 11.1.
76 C6digos de Procedimiento Penal§ 23 [CCP-Colombia].

706 UNIVERSI1Y OF TORONTO lAW JOURNAL
Derivative evidence, however, is only a 'fruit' of the violation if there is
a close causal connection between the violation and its discovery and the
evidence would not have been discovered but for the violation. Some
recent statutes explicitly provide for exceptions to exclusion developed
in US jurisprudence. For instance, CCP-Brazil (2008) provides,
Illicit evidence, understood to be that obtained in violation of constitutional and
legal norms, is inadmissible and should be removed from the trial: (1) the evidence derived from the illicit evidence is also inadmissible except where there
is no obvious or causal nexus between the one and the other or where the
derived evidence could be obtained from a source independent of the
former; (2) An independent source is considered to be such, that when, following the normal procedures used in practice which are proper in criminal investigation, it would be capable of leading to the facts which are the objects to be
proved. 77

In a similar vein, CCP-Colombia explicitly makes exceptions for 'attenuated connection, independent source, inevitable discovery, and others
provided by law. ' 78

IV ~at

is a constitutional or fundamental right?

A INTRODUCTION

Assuming that most jurisdictions will only exclude probative evidence if
the police violate a fundamental or constitutional right, it is still not
always easy for courts or law givers to determine which violations fall
into this category. Courts thus make value judgments which could be considered to be a balancing of the seriousness of the violation in relation to
the legal interest protected by a constitutional proVIsiOn. The
Constitution of Colombia states that 'evidence obtained in violation of
due process is null in the full sense of the law (in plena derecho).' 79 We
know from USSC case law that determining what is a violation of due
process in the taking of a confession or 'probable cause' in the issuance
of a warrant to search or wiretap can imply a complicated weighing of the
'totality of the circumstances. ' 80 The Constitution of Portugal lists specific
constitutional violations which will trigger exclusion: 'Any evidence

77
78
79
80

Supra note 36, !i 157.
Supra note 76, § 455.
Constitution of Columbia (1991) art 29 [Const-Columbia].
On the 'totality of the circumstances' approach related to the admissibility of arguably
'involuntary confessions,' see LaFave et a!, supra note 53 at 343-Y. In relation to
determining 'probable cause,' see Illinois v Gates, 462 US 213 at 267-74 (1983) [Gates].
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obtained by torture, force, violation of the physical or moral integrity of
the individual, wrongful interference in private life, the home, correspondence, or telecommunications is of no effect.'"'
We have already seen that the nullities approach adopted in many civillaw criminal procedure codes differentiates between nullities which affect
constitutional rights or substantial interests of the defendant, called
'absolute' nullities or nullities of 'general order,' and those which are
only relative and may be sanitized, and so on. The German Supreme
Court, in a similar way, has found that '[i]f the procedural provision
which has been violated, does not, or not primarily, serve to protect
the defendant, then a prohibition on use will be unlikely; on the other
hand, a prohibition on use is appropriate, when the violated procedural
provision is designed to secure the foundations of the procedural position of the accused or defendant in a criminal prosecution. ' 82
The right to privacy in one's home and one's communications and the
right to remain silent are core constitutional rights in all democracies, but
it is also legal for poliCe to search homes, intercept private communications, and interrogate criminal suspects if they follow the correct procedures. Some of the procedures are directly required by constitutions
or constitutional decisions of high courts because they affect the core
interests protected by the constitutional rights if violated. Other rules dictated by statute are often considered to be of lesser importance. I will
assess what I believe to be the core rules in these two areas which
should usually trigger exclusion of evidence if violated.
B THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LIMITATIONS ON GOVERNMENTAL
INVASIONS OF PRIVACY

i The requirement of probable cause and judicial authorization
If a dwelling search or wiretap is based on probable cause and is judicially
authorized, its constitutional underpinnings are normally guaranteed. I
believe that these are the two core factors which, to use the language of
the ECHR, are 'necessary in a democratic society' 8 ' before authorities
invade protected areas of privacy for the purposes of criminal investigation.
If the investigative measure violates statutory rules which are unrelated to the
amount of suspicion necessary to search or wiretap or to the fact ofjudicial
authorization, then the Spanish courts, for instance, consider the violation
to be an 'irregularity' rather than an 'illegality' and treat it like a 'relative

81 Constitution of the Portuguese Republic, 7Lh revision (200!'1) art 32(6) [Const-Portugal]
required.
82 38 BGHSt 214 at 218-22; for English translation, see Thaman, Criminal Procedure, supra
note 37 at Ill [38 BGHSt 214].
83 Supra note 8, art 8.
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nullity' which would not lead to exclusion of evidence.84 For example, in one
Spanish case, the police conducted a search which was authorized by the
investigating magistrate and based on sufficient suspicion, but neither the
investigating magistrate nor his secretary were present during the search, violating a statutory norm regulating the execution of searches. The Spanish
Supreme Court held that this error did not affect a fundamental right,
and therefore the sanction was merely the annulment of the act documenting the search, making it inadmissible at trial. This, however, did not prevent
the police who conducted the search from testifYing in court to prove the
seizure of the drugs and the corpus delicti of the crime.85
In principle, the USSC has also categorized certain violations of the laws
regulating wiretaps and search warrants as being of sub-constitutional status
so that violation does not require suppression. Thus, mistakes in the
execution of an otherwise valid search warrant86 or wiretap87 will not lead
to exclusion. By refusing to suppress the fruits of an otherwise constitutionally valid warranted search in Hudson v Michigan,"" despite a violation of the
'knock and announce' requirement of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
41, the USSC has come to a result similar to that of the Spanish Supreme
Court but had to resort to contorted reasoning because of a previous
decision in which complying with the 'knock and announce' rule was
declared to be constitutionally required."9
There will, of course, be differences in the interpretation of what is an unconstitutional search because, while the United States requires 'probable cause' for
the i<>suance of a search warrant or wiretap,90 some other countries, such as
Germany, Spain, or France, appear to require a lesser degree of suspicion.91
84 On the notion that 'illicit evidence' is suppressible under LOPJ-Spain, supra note 36, §
11.1 and that 'irregular' evidence falls under LOPJ-Spain, ibid § 238, the nullity
provision, and does not lead to suppression of fruits of the violation, see Marien
Aguilera Morales, 'Regia de exclusion y acusatorio' in Lorena Bachmaier Winter
eta!, Proceso penal y sistemas acusatorios (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2008) 93 [Morales].
85 Supreme Court of Spain, Decision of july 9, 1993, RJ 1993, No 6060, 7682 at 7682-3;
for English translation, see Thaman, Criminal Procedure, supra note 37 at 106-8.
86 See the following two cases in which aspects of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 41
regulating serving of search warrants were violated: United States v Schoenheit, 856 F (2d)
74 (8th Cir 1988), on violation of prohibition of night service; United States v Charles,
883 F (2d) 355 (5th Cir 1989), on serving officer did not have warrant in hand.
87 In relation to the wiretap statute, the provision must 'directly and substantially
implement' the congressional intention to restrict the use of electronic surveillance
or be 'intended to play a central role in the statutory scheme.' United States v
Giordano, 416 US 505 at 527 (1974); United States v Chavez, 416 US 562 at 574 (1974).
88 Supra note 33 at 594.
89 See Wilwn v Arkansas, 514 US 927 (1995). The Court had to base its decision on the
fact that the seizure of the evidence was not a 'fruit' of the unlawful entry; see also
Hudson, ibid at 586-7.
90 Described as a 'fair probability' that the thing searched for will be present in the
indicated location; Gates, supra note 80 at 238.
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ii The constitutional exception for exigent circumstances

Both the German and Italian Constitutions provide for an exception to
the warrant requirement in cases of exigent circumstances, or what the
Germans call 'danger in delay.' 92 This exception is universally recognized
but can easily be abused, so it is important that it be narrowly construed
to prevent large-scale evasion of the requirement of pre-search or prewiretap judicial authorization.
Although it was well-known that German law enforcement officials
seldom, if ever, acquired search warrants"' and always (successfully)
defended their warrantless searches retrospectively"• with a perfunctory
incantation of the words 'danger in delay,' often attributed to the fact
that there were no evening-duty judges to issue warrants, the appellate
courts winked at this sleight of hand, claiming the trial judge's discretion
could not be reviewed on appeal. 95 The German Constitutional Court
finally took note of this scandalous situation in 2001 and attempted to
rectify the situation by limiting the exception for 'danger in delay' to
cases that were clearly documented and by requiring judges to be on
duty twenty-four hours for the purposes of issuing warrants.""
To prevent such manipulation, the exception for 'exigent circumstances' should be limited to two fact situations: the 'flagrant crime' 97
and real emergency situations involving threat to human life, health, or
property. An example of a statute that puts clear restrictions on the invo.,.
cation of 'exigent circumstances' is the us federal wiretap statute, which
allows warrantless wiretaps only in emergency situations that involve
91 On the ncar complete discretion of French judges to search any place and seize
anything that the judge deems 'useful to the manifestation of the truth,' see Frase,
supra note 35 at 211. On the low substantive barriers to searches in Germany, where
mere 'suspicion' is sufficient, see Thomas Weigend, 'Germany' in Craig M Bradley,
cd, Criminal Procedure: A Worldwide Study, 2d ed (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic
Press, 2007) 243 at 249 [Weigend]. For a Spanish investigating magistrate to order a
search, there need only be 'indications' that the person or objects sought are
located therein; Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal § 546 [CCP-Spain].
92 The exception for 'exigent circumstances' is found in Basic Law for the Federal
Republic of Germany art 13(2) [Canst-Germany] and Constitution of the Italian
Republic art 14 [Canst-Italy].
93 Weigend, supra note 91 at 250 estimated that only 10% of searches were conducted
with warrants.
94 In Germany and many other countries, police must acquire judicial validation of
exigent searches within two or three days after the search; see CCP-Germany, s~pra
note 60, § 98(2).
95 Andreas Ransiek, 'Durchsuchung, Beschlagnahme und Verwertungsverbot' (2002) 10
Dcr Strafverteidiger 565 at 566 [Ransiek]. In effect, only the most arbitrary searches
ever led to exclusion of evidence; ibid.
96 BVerfGE 103 at 142.
97 An exception specifically included in Constituci6n Espanola de 27 diciembre 1978 art 18(2)
[Canst-Spain].
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'immediate danger of death or serious physical injury to any person' or
for conspiratorial activities that threaten 'the national security interest'
or are 'characteristic of organized crime.' 9 " The USSC has also created
an exception to the warrant requirement which allows police to enter a
house with less than probable cause to save lives, prevent injuries, or
protect property. 99
The 'flagrant crime' exception would apply to 'hot pursuit' cases, 100
where probable cause develops suddenly upon commi~sion of a crime
and escape of the culprit or destruction of evidence is likely. If,
however, the suspicion of the presence of dn1gs in a dwelling, for
instance, comes as a result of an investigation, then, in principle, a
warrant should be obtained. The police should not be able to create
the need for exigent circumstances by, for instance, walking up to the
target house and announcing they are present so as to create a pretext
for entering to prevent the destruction of evidence. 101
iii Instances where a constitutional violation permits of no further balancing
Thus, when a home has been searched without a search warrant based on
probable cause or without exigent circumstances, this should be considered to be a clear constitutional violation and exclusion should be
the presumptive remedy. This was traditionally the approach of the
USSC following Mapp 102 until the 'good faith' test and 'cost-benefit' balancing was introduced in Leon/ 03 as it was for the Spanish courts in interpreting LOPJ-Spain section 11.1 104 until balancing was introduced in 1998, as
long as the taint of the violation was not attenuated. The Irish Supreme
Court, which initially employed a simple balancing test to determine
admissibility of evidence,'"' changed course in 1990 and recognized a categorical exclusionary rule in cases where police clearly violate the constitutional rights of citizens, rejecting even the 'good faith' exception
recognized by the USSC. According to Judge Finlay in People (DPP) v
Kenny, 'The detection of crime and the conviction of guilty persons, no
98 18 USC§ 2518(7) (a). The federal prosecutor must then request post factum approval of
a judge within forty-eight hours. Such immediate review after an emergency invasion of
privacy is otherwise not required for emergency searches in ·the United States.
99 Bri{{ham City, Utah v Stuart, 547 US 398 at 403 (2006). Such searches should not,
however, be pretexts for searches for evidence of crime.
100 See Warden v Hayden, 387 US 294 al 310 (1967) [Warden].
101 See United States v Timberlake, 896 F (2d) 592 at 597 (DC Cir 1990); Dunnuck v State, 786
A (2d) 695 at 699-700 (Md 2001) with respect to knocking on a door without warrant.
But see contra United States v MacDonald, 916 F (2d) 766 at 772 (2d Cir 1990), allowing
creation of exigent circumstances by knocking on the door.
102 Supra note 18.
103 Supra note 26.
104 See text accompanying note 75 supra.
105 See Peaple (AG) v O'Brien, [1965] IR 142 at 1fi0-1 SC (I).
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matter how important they may be in relation to the ordering of society,
cannot, however, in my view, outweigh the unambiguously expressed constitutiomil obligation as far as practicable to defend and vindicate the personal rights of the citizen.' 106
Categorical statutory exclusionary rules are otherwise clearly less
common in relation to violations of the right to privacy than they are
for violations of the right to counsel or silence in the context of interrogations. The great exception, however, is with violations of the wiretap statutes. Thus, when core provisions of the US wiretap statute have been
violated, the federal code provides that
no part of the contents of such communication and no evidence derived therefrom may be received in evidence in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or
before any court, grand jury, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of the United States, a State, or a political
subdivision thereof. 107

This is likely the broadest explicit statutory exclusionary rule in US law
and clearly extends to 'fruits of the poisonous tree.' It also brooks of
no exceptions based in 'standing' or 'good faith' mistakes. 10" CCP-Italy
also expressly prohibits use of the 'results of interceptions' made in violation of the wiretap statute. 109
A key reason for court reluctance to exclude evidence gained from violations of the right to privacy has been that such violations usually occur
unrelated to the violation of any trial right such as the privilege against
self-incrimination and thus, in the words of the German Supreme
Court, will not affect the 'procedural position' of the defendant, or in
the approach of the ECtHR, will not affect the right to a fair trial protected by ECHR article 6. 110
C CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON TNTF:RROGATTON PRAGTIC:F:S

i Admonitions as to the right to silence and to counsel
While the use of means such as torture; cruel, inhuman, and degrading
treatment; and lesser tactics which render a confession 'involuntary'
clearly constitute a fundamental rights violation that leads to suppression

106 [1990] 2 IR 110 at 134 SC (I) (Finlay CJ).
107 18 usc § 2515.
108 See United States v Rice, 478 F (3d) 704 at 711-2 (6th Cir 2007), which finds there is no
'good faith' exception to the wiretap exclusionary rule.
109 Supra note 35, § 271.
110 In Leon, supra note 26 at 906, the USSC stated that the wrong perpetrated by the Fourth
Amendment violation is 'fully accomplished' at the time of the illegal search and no
'new Fourth Amendment wrong' is perpetrated by admitting illegally seized evidence
into the trial. The 'fair trial' test of the ECtHR will be discussed in Part IV-B below.
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of an ensuing statement, another very important procedural rule is the
requirement that a suspect or defendant be aware of the right to
silence and the right to counsel before being questioned.lll Whereas
the former, more egregious violation constitutes an attack on human
dignity and sometimes bodily integrity, the latter is more of a procedural
error which undermines the defendant's ability to defend herself during
the criminal trial.
The warnings made famous in the USSC's landmark decision of
Miranda v Arizonam were deemed by the majority in that case to be
firmly rooted in the Fifth Amendment and therefore constitutionally
required to dissipate the inherent coerciveness of custodial interrogation.
The consequence of a violation of the rules the Court laid down was
exclusion of the statement<; gathered following the violation. The USSC
also claimed that it is with custodial interrogation that 'our adversary
system of criminal proceedings commences.' 113 In a similar vein, the
German Supreme Court has proclaimed that the German variant of
Miranda warnings are 'designed to secure the foundations of the procedural position of the accused.' Exclusion of a statement taken in violation of the German Miranda-warnings is mandated even if the suspect
interrogated was out of custody, as long as probable cause existed to
arrest him for the crime which was the subject of the interrogation. 114
Although most democratic countries have adopted the teaching of
Miranda, the constitutional underpinnings of the rule have been called
into question in the country of their origin. In 1971, the USSC began permitting the use of a statement taken in violation of the Miranda rules in
order to impeach a defendant whose courtroom testimony contradicted
it. 115 By 1974, the violation of the Miranda rules was no longer characterized as a violation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination or the Sixth Amendment right to counsel but as a 'prophylactic
rule' the violation of which would not affect the use of the 'fruits of
the poisonous tree.' 116 Although the USSC reversed course in 2000 and
declared that the Miranda warnings were of constitutional status, m it
refused to reverse the exceptions to the exclusionary rule based in its

Ill Most European and Latin American jurisdictions now require that persons subject to
police interrogation be admonished of their right to confer with counsel and their
right to remain silent before being interrogated; see Thaman, Criminal Procedure,
supra note 37 at 85-96. In general, see Stephen C Thaman, 'Miranda in
Comparative Perspective' (2001) 45 Saint Louis ULJ 581.
112 Supra note 22.
113 Ibid at 477.
114 38 BGHSt 214, supra note 82 at 218-22, 224-5.
115 Harris v New York, 401 US 222 at 225-6 (1971).
116 Michigan v Tucker, 417 US 433 at 438-9,450 (1974).
117 Dickim;nn v United States, 530 US 428 at 437-8 (2000).
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sub-constitutional status and a plurality of the Court recently returned to
calling Miranda warnings mere 'prophylactic' safeguards not themselves
required by the Fifth Amendment in holding that physical evidence
found as a result of a Mirandardefective confession is admissible. 118
ii The actual right to counsel before and during interrogations
Although the Miranda decision clearly intimated that an uncharged suspect
in custody must be advised of the right to have counsel present during the
entire interrogation, 119 the Court never required that police assure that
those facing interrogation are actually able to speak to lawyers before deciding whether they will waive their rights. 120 Police can even tell suspects that no
lawyer will be provided until they are charged and go to court' 2 ' or refuse to
tell a suspect that a lawyer has been actually retained. 122 An invocation of the
right to counsel will certainly prevent any further interrogation of a jailed
uncharged suspect even as to different charges unless the defendant reinitiates contact with the interrogators, 123 but the dissent of Justice White in
Miranda already expressed doubt as to whether a waiver of the right to
counsel allowed by the majority could ever truly considered to be voluntary
if custody was per se coercive in the first place. 124
As a result, the overwhelming majority of suspects in the United States
waive their Miranda rights and speak to police without ever having talked
to a lawyer. 125 Although the USSC originally held that once a person is
charged and is represented by counsel or has requested or been assigned
counsel, no interrogation may take place in the absence of counsel or
without counsel's consent. But that rule was recently overruled by the
USSC, and the Miranda rules now apply whether or not the suspect is
represented by counsel. 126

118 Patane, supra note 64 at 632.
119 Supra note 22 at 492. This was clearly reaffirmed in Florida v Pawel~ 130 S Ct 1195 at
1211 (2010).
120 The Miranda court, supra note 22 at 474, said it was not necessary to have a system of
'station house lawyers' ready to advise incarcerated suspects as is required in England
and Wales under the system of 'duty solicitors'; see England and Wales, Code of
Practice (C) at para 6.6(a)-(c) [PACE].
121 California v Prysock, 453 US 3!\!\ (1981); Duckworth v Eagan, 442 US 195 (1989).
122 Moran v Burbine, 475 US 412 at 422 (1986). The Court stated, 'No doubt the additional
information would have been useful to respondent; perhaps it even might have
affected his decision to confess.'
123 Edwards v Arizona, 4!\1 US 477 (1981) [Edwards]; Arizona v Roberson, 486 US 675 (1988).
124 Supra note 22 at 536-7 (White, dissenting).
125 According to one study, only around one quarter of suspects elected to remain silent.
Richard Leo, 'The Impact of Miranda Revisited' (1996) 86 J Crim L & Criminology 621
at 657-9.
126 Montejo v Louisiana, 129 S Ct 2079 at 2085, 2089-91 (2009).
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Unlike in the United States, however, in Europe the right actually to
consult with counsel before and during interrogation is obtaining indubitable constitutional status as a fundamental right. According to CCPRussia, for example, no pre-trial statement made by a defendant to law
enforcement officials which was given in the absence of counsel may
be used at trial if the defendant retract<> the statement at or before. trial
even if the suspect waived the right to counsel. 127 A similar rule has
been recognized in Spain. 12" In Italy, the denial of the assistance of
counsel constitutes a nullity of general order and, in the context of
police interrogation, an 'absolute nullity' which cannot be sanitized
and must be raised ex officio by the judge. 129 Exclusion follows even if
the suspect offers a statement voluntarily in the absence of counsel. 1' 0
Traditionally, some European regimes gave the police a determinate
period to interrogate suspects (called garde a vue in France and
Belgium) and the right to counsel was only recognized for subsequent
interrogation by an investigating magistrate. 131 In 2008, however, the
Grand Chamber of the ECtHR in Salduz v Turkey 132 held that the right
to counsel, guaranteed by ECHR article 6(3) (c) applies not only at trial
but also during the investig-ative stage and most assuredly during
the first police interrogation. Any conviction based on an admission or
statement taken in violation of this right constitutes a violation of
the general right to a fair trial guaranteed under ECHR article 6(1).

127 CCP-Russia, supra note 61, § 75(2) (1). This provision was introduced due to the
prevalent use of coercion by Russian criminal investigators, not only in inducing
confessions, but also in inducing waivers of counsel prior to interrogation. Cf
Stephen C Thaman, 'The Nullification of the Russian Jury; Lessons for Jury-Inspired
Reform in Eurasia and Beyond' (2007) 40 Cornell Int'l LJ 355 at 375-8.
128 See CCP-Spain, supra note 91, §§ 520(2) (a) -(c) and discussion in Eduardo de Urbano
Castrillo & Miguel Angel Torres Morato, La Prueba lllicita Penal: Estudio jurisprudencial,
3d ed (Navarr£L, Spain; Thomson; Aranzadi, 2003) at 78 [lJrbano Castrillo & Torres
Morato].
129 CCP-Italy, supra note 35, §§ 178(l)(c), 179(1), 350(3), and discussion in Marilena
Colamussi, 'In tema di deducibiliti della nulliti derivante dalla violazione del diritto
dell'imputato in stato di custodia cautelare di conferire con il proprio difensore' in
Vincenzo Perchinunno, ed, Percorsi di Procedura Penale. Dal garantismo inquisitorio a un
accusatorio non garantito (Milan; Giuffre, 1996) at 37.
130 CCP-Italy, ibid§ 350(6,7).
131 On how much easier it was for police to get confessions in the absence of counsel than
during questioning by the fuge d'instruction, see Pradel, supra note 40 at 386-97. Today,
the suspect in police custody is not advised of the right to counsel but may request to
see counsel during Karde a vue, but the inten~ew may not exceed thirty minutes and the
lawyer has no right to be present during police interrogation. CCP-France, supra note
36, §§ 63-4. In Belgium, there was no right to counsel even during interrogation
before the investigating magistrate; see Laurens van Puyenbroeck, 'Belgium' in Ed
Cape et al, eds, Effective Criminal Defence in J;;'urope (Oxford, UK: Intersentia, 2010) 78.
132 (2009), 49 EHRR 421 [Salduz].

EXCLUSIONARY RULES AND THE TOLERATION OF POUCE LAWLESSNESS

715

The Court said, 'The rights of the defence will in principle be irretrievably prejudiced when incriminating statements made during
police interrogation without access to a lawyer are used for a conviction.'133 The Grand Chamber did, however, allow for waivers of fair trial
rights 134 and this could be interpreted as allowing the right to waive the
right to counsel during the first interrogation. 135
The decisions subsequent to Salduz, however, indicate that the ECtHR
has in mind a right to counsel during pre-trial interrogation that is significantly stronger than that articulated in Miranda or its diluted postWarren Court progeny. First of all, the Court makes it clear that a
waiver of the right to counsel must be unequivocal and cannot be presumed from the fact that the suspect answers questions after having
acknowledged understanding of his rights. A valid waiver must be
knowing and intelligent, which means that 'he could reasonably have
foreseen what the consequences would bc.' 136 The ECtHR further held
that it violates the right to counsel to continue questioning a suspect
who has asked for counsel, unless the suspect has spoken to counsel or
reinitiates the contact with police. 137 It also found that subsequent confessions where the defendant did arguably waive his Miranda rights did
not attenuate the taint of the previous confessions given without
counsel. 138 Finally, the ECtHR clearly linked the right to remain silent
with the presumption of innocence and the notion that the prosecution
must prove its case 'without resort to evidence obtained through coercion
or oppression in defiance of the will of the accused.''""

133 Ibid at 435-9.
134 Ibid at 438, para 59.
135 However, in a later case, Oleg Kolesnik v Ukmine, No 17551/02 (19 November 2009)
(EHCR) at para 37, Lhe ECtHR held that ECHR, supra note 8, art 6, had been
violated in a case where the defendant signed a waiver of the right Lo counsel and
confessed because he credibly alleged that police had coerced him to waive the right.
136 Pishchalnikov v Russia, No 7025/04, (24 September 2009) at paras 76-7 (ECHR)
[Pishchalnikov]. The EGtHR emphasized that the defendant was questioned about
grave crimes such as murder after having been arrested for another crime and that
only with counsel could he have assessed the consequences of agreeing to ·the
interrogation. Ibid at para 80. In contrast, the USSC recently ruled that an
unequivocal waiver of Miranda rights, including the right to counsel, is no longer
necessary and may be inferred from the fact that the defendant eventually answers
questions; sec Berghuis v Thompkins, 130 S Ct 2250 at 2260-2 (2010).
137 Pishchalnikov, ibid at para 79. The language seems plucked from Edwards, supra note
123 at 484.
138 Pishchalnikvu, ibid at para 81-2. Here the ECtHR made a finding similar to that in
Missouri v Seibert, 542 US 600 at 601 (2004), which held that a Miranda waiver after a
preceding statement taken in wilful violation of the Miranda rules could not be
deemed to be knowing.
139 Zaichenlw v Russia, ~o 39660/02 (18 February 2010) at para 38 (ECHR).
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The decisions in Salduz and its progeny are definitely a threat to the
garde a vue procedures in France and Belgium and are quickly leading
to changes in other parts of Europe. 140
iii Exigent circumstances in relation to interrogations?
The Salduz court admitted that there are possible restrictions on the right
to counsel at the first interrogation: 'The question, in each case, has
therefore been whether the restriction was justified and, if so, whether,
in the light of the entirety of the proceedings, it has not deprived the
accused of a fair hearing, for even a justified restriction is capable of
doing so in certain circumstances. 141 A typical example would be the
restriction allowed in Code of Practice C of the Police and Criminal
Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) in England and Wales, when the right to
speak to a duty solicitor may be postponed if 'delay will involve an
immediate risk of harm to persons or serious loss of, or damage to, property.'142 The USSC has also recognized an exception to the need to give a
suspect the Miranda warnings when 'prompted by a concern for the
public safety.' 143
On the other hand, the ECtHR has made it clear that there are no
exceptions to the prohibition against torture or inhuman and degrading
treatment provided by ECHR article 3 even in the 'fight against terrorism
and organized crime' or to save human life. 144
D FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

This summary suggests that, in addition to the right against torture and
cruel and inhuman treatment, discussed above, the right to privacy
within one's home and the right against self-incrimination also fall into
the category of fundamental rights. Evidence obtained in violation of
these rights should normally be excluded.

140 In early March 2011, the Belgian Senate approved a law providing for counsel before
the first interrogation. 'Le Senat adopte Ia loi Salduz: les droits des justiciables
renforces' (3 March 2011), online: rtbf.be <http://www.rtbf.be/info/belgique/
detail_le-senat-adopte-la-loi-salduz-les-droits-dujusticiable-renforces?id=5714303 > ; in
France, the Conseil constitutionnel ordered in April 2011 that Salduz be
implemented in France, and lawyers stormed the jails demanding to represent their
clients. Marion Isobel, 'Case Watch: Salduz fever sweeps Europe' opm Society Blog
(26 April 2011), online: Open Society Foundations <http://blog.soros.org/2011/04/
case-watch-salduz-fevei~sweeps-europe/

141
142
143
144

>.

Salduz, supra note 132 at 436, para 52.
PACE, supra note 120, art 6.6(b)(i).
New York v Qyarles, 467 US 649 at 656 (1984).
Giifgtm, supra note 53 at 23, 27 at para 87, 107.
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v Balancing by the courts
A INTRODUCTION

I have tried to articulate what violations would constitute fundamental or
constitutional violations in a democratic country which respects human
rights. This is clearly the case when interrogation methods are used
that violate CAT or render a statement involuntary, and the consensus
is growing for imposing a bright-line rule for interrogations in violation
of the right to counsel. I would also make this claim in relation to violations of the right to privacy in one's domicile and private communications, when law enforcement authorities proceed without judicial
authorization or probable cause in the absence of exigent circumstances.
In some jurisdictions, the primary evidence and sometimes the actual
'fruits of the poisonous tree' are suppressed upon such a finding.
But this is not the case in the majority of jurisdictions, where courts
tend to balance even clear constitutional violations against other important interests and often will suppress neither the direct nor the derivative
evidence emanating from them. The use of any balancing test where fundamental rights have been violated, therefore, threatens to subordinate
the right to other interests that have less (if any) constitutional significance; on the other hand, unlawfully obtained evidence that does not
involve violations of fundamental rights may be admitted or excluded,
depending on the balance of interests. In the rest of this section, I
review the main tests and factors that courts have used in balancing interests. I will first examine three general tests, which I call the 'fair trial' test,
the judicial integrity' test,' and the 'public interest' test. I will then
examine separate factors used in these tests such as the 'good faith' of
the violating officer, the seriousness of the violation, the question of
whether the evidence was actually the 'fruit' of the violation, the importance of the evidence to determining the truth, and the seriousness of
the offence for the proof of which the illegally gathered evidence has
been proffered.
B THE 'FAIR TRIAL' ASSESSMENT

The PACE provides that
[i]n any proceedings the court may refuse to allow evidence on which the
prosecution proposes to rely to be given if it appears to the court that, having
regard to all the circumstances, including the circumstances in which the evidence was obtained, the admission of the evidence would have such an
adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not to
admit it. 145
145 PACE, supra note 120, art 78(1).
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In employing its 'fair trial' test, the ECtHR traditionally defers to domestic
exclusionary practices. Thus, although the Court has found violations of
the right to privacy under ECHR article 8, in many cases involving illegal
wiretapping or interception of private conversations, it has consistently
held, that
[i]t is not the role of the Court to determine, as a matter of principle, whether
particular types of evidence - for example, unlawfully obtained evidence - may
be admissible or, indeed, whether the applicant was guilty or not. The question
which must be answered is whether the pmceedings as a whole, including the way
in which the evidence was obtained, were fair. This involves an examination of
the 'unlawfulness' in question and, where violation of another Convention
right is concerned, the nature of the violation found. 11"

When the Spanish Constitutional Court held in 1984 that evidence
seized. in violation of the constitution had to be suppressed, it grounded
the prohibition of use on (1) the violation of a fair trial with all the
guarantees established by law (article 24 of the Spanish Constitution);
(2) a denial of equality of arms, in the sense that the defence is not
allowed to violate the law in order to produce evidence; and (3) a violation of the presumption of innocence, which in Spanish law restricts the
prosecutor to the use of legally gathered evidence to rebut the
presumption. ' 47
Thus, whereas Spain finds a categorical violation of the right to a fair
trial if the fruits of a violation of constitutional magnitude are used at
trial, PACE article 78(1) gives the court what has been described in
the literature as 'broad and unstructured' discretion to balance a
plethora of factors against the illegality of police actions, such as the seriousness of the offence, good faith of the officers, the type of evidence
and its reliability, the existence of corroborative evidence, the type of
illegality, and the type of right infringed. 148 We can see here that the
'fair trial' criterion is flexible enough that, with so many factors in the
balance, each judge can put his or her own stamp on what is a 'fair
trial. '149

146 Allan v United Kingdom (2003), 36 EHRR 12 at 143, 155-6, para 42. The first important
case taking this approach was Schenck v Switzerland ( 1988), 13 EHRR 242 at 264, para 46.
To my knowledge, the ECtHR has never found a violation of the right to a fair trial
based solely on the use of evidence seized in violation of the right to privacy under
ECHR, suprd note 8, art 8.
147 STC 114/1984 (29 November 1984), discussed in de Urbano Castrillo & Torres Morato,
supra note 128 at 11-2; Aguilera Morales, supra note 84 at 84-8.
148 David Ormerod, 'ECHR and the Exclusion of Evidence: Trial Remedies for Article 8
Breaches?' (2003) Crim L Rev 61 at 64.
149 According to Andrew Ashworth, 'Excluding Evidence As Protecting Rights' (1977)
Crim L Rev 723 '[I]f courts arc allowed simply to pick and choose the guiding
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C PRESERVING THE INTEGRITY OF THE COURTS

Peter Duff correctly notes that, if exclusionary rules are to have any
meaning they must be 'extrinsic' and not anchored in the 'intrinsic'
emphasis on probative value/credibilityY" The notion of judicial integrity' is such an 'extrinsic' justification for exclusion; yet scholars differ
as to its theoretical underpinnings, differentiating among (1) the 'disciplinary' model adopted by the United States which focuses on deterrence
of unconstitutional police conduct; (2) the 'vindicatory' model, which
focuses on protecting citizens' constitutional rights and would tend to
automatic exclusion once a significant violation has been ascertained; 151
and (3) the 'moral legitimacy' approach, which balances the seriousness
of the constitutional violation and the harm to the public if a dangerous
criminal were to go free.''"
For the Mapp court, of course, the 'imperative of judicial integrity' was
vindicatory and meant that 'the criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the
law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly
than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the
charter of its own existence.'' 53 The Court in Leon abandoned this high
ground by equating judicial integrity with the exclusively disciplinary
rationale, aimed only at deterring police and not at judicial errors. 154
Article 24(2) of the Canadian Charter dearly proclaims judicial integrity as the basis for exclusion: '[W] here ... a court finds that evidence was
obtained in a manner that infringed or denied any of the rights or freedoms guaranteed by this Charter, the evidence shall be excluded if it is
established that, having regard to all the circumstances, the admission
of it in the proceedings would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.'155 In interpreting this provision, Canadian courts originally

150
151

152
153
154
155

principle(s) in the circumstances of any individual case, there is unlikely to be a
consistent approach and a danger of the question of admissibility being left to the
'whim of the particular court' [Ashworth]; cited in Peter Duff, 'Admissibility of
Improperly Obtained Physical Evidence in the Scottish Criminal Trial: The Search
for Principle' (2004) 8 Ed L Rev 152 at 159 [Duff].
Ibid at 159.
The New Zealand courts have rejected the deterrent rationale and focus exclusively on
'vindication of the right' Lhat has been breached, though they still engage in balancing;
see Richard Mahoney, 'Abolition of New Zealand's Prima Facie Exclusionary Rule'
(2003) Crim L Rev 607 at 610. The Hawai'ian Supreme (.;ourt recognizes judicial
integrity, deterrence, and the protection of privacy as foundations of its exclusionary
rule. State v Bridges, 925 P (2d) 357 at 365 (Hawai'i 1996) [Mahoney].
Duff, supra note 149 at 160-74.
Mapp, supra note 18 at 659.
Leon, supra note 26 at 916.
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982 c 11. Article 35(5) of the Constitution
of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 was patterned after the Can~dian Charter and
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developed two separate tests to delermine whether exclusion was
appropriate. Under the first test, exclusion would result, regardless of
the seriousness of the violation, if it had as a consequence that a
suspect-defendanl was 'conscripted' to produce evidence against
himself. The second test focused exclusively on the seriousness of the violation such that a failure to exclude would bring the administration of
justice into disrepute. Important factors here would be the intentionality
of the violation and whether police acted in 'good faith' but not whether
there might have been a hypothetical clean path to the evidence (i.e.,
inevitable discovery). 156 Recently, the Canadian courts have moved to a
simpler balancing test, which now includes the 'moral legitimacy' criterion. The test involves the weighing of three factors: ( 1) the severity
of the violation; (2) the question of whether the admission of the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute from the
perspective of society's interest in respect for Charter rights; and (3)
the effect. of admitting the evidence on the public interest in having
the case adjudicated on its merits. 157
D THE PUBLIC IMPACT OF THE ADMISSIBILITY DECISION

CCP-Taiwan (as amended in 2003), requires the court to balance 'the
protection of human rights and the preservation of public interests' in
deciding whether or not to exclude illegally gathered evidence. 158 In
1950, the Scottish High Court developed a test which balanced '(a) the
interest of the citizen to be protected from illegal or irregular invasions
of his liberties by the authorities, and (b) the interest of the State to
secure that evidence bearing upon the commission of crime and necessary to enable justice to be done shall not be withheld from Courts of law
on any merely formal or technical ground. ' 159
But what is the 'public interest'? This could mean that the public
would be appalled if evidence resulting from torture or pervasive

156
157

158
159

contains similar language, mandating exclusion if 'the admission of that evidence
would render the trial unfair or otherwise be detrimental to the administration of
justice'; see PJ Schwikkard & SE van der Merwe, 'South Africa' in Craig M Bradley,
ed, Criminal Procedure: A Worldwide Study, 2d ed (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic
Press, 2007) 471 at 487-8 [Schwikkard & van der Merwe].
Kent Roach, 'Canada' in Craig M Bradley, ed, Criminal Procedure: A Worldwide Study, 2d
ed (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2007) 57 at 71-2 [Roach].
See R v Grant, 2009 SCC 32 at paras 95-7, [2009] SCR 353 [Grant]; R v Harrison, 2009
SCC 34 at para 2, [2009] SCR 494. For a positive assessment of this change, see Don
Stuart, 'Welcome Flexibility and Better Criteria from the Supreme Court of Canada
for Exclusion of Evidence Obtained in Violation of the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms' (2010) 16 Southwestern Journal of International Law 313.
Taiwan Constitution art 158-4 [CCP-Taiwan].
Lawrie v Muir, 1950JC 19 at 26 (HCJ Scot).
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warrantless wiretapping were used in the courts. 160 It could also refer to
'the public's interest in maintaining the integrity of the courts and in
ensuring the observance of the law and minimum standards of propriety
by those entrusted with powers of law enforcement,' as stated by the
Australian High Court, which returns us to the interests of judicial
integrity. 161
In Leon, the USSC proclaimed,
The substantial social costs exacted by the exclusionary rule for the vindication of
Fourth Amendment rights have long been a source of concern. Our cases have
consistently recognized that unbending application of the exclusionary sanction
to enforce ideals of governmental rectitude would impede unacceptably the
truth-finding functions of judge and jury ... particularly, when law enforcement
officers have acted in objective good faith or their transgressions have been
minor, the magnitude of the benefit conferred on such guilty defendants
offends basic concepts of the criminal justice system. 162
Thus, the USSC posits a 'public interest' in 'having juries receive all
probative evidence of a crime.' 163 More recently, the Court bemoaned
the exclusionary rule's 'costly toll upon truth-seeking,' which consists in
'letting guilty and possibly dangerous defendants go free.' 164 Exclusion,
for the USSC, is now a 'last resort' 165 subject to a balancing test that pits
the exclusionary rule's 'deterrence benefits' against its 'substantial
social costs.' 166
With the USSC's disciplinary, cost-benefit approach, the 'intrinsic'
emphasis on not losing probative evidence is pushing back the vindicatory interest in protecting constitutional rights, paving the way for a possible return to the old common-law presumption of admissibility of
relevant evidence or its inquisitorial counterpart, which prioritized
truth over rights.
E APPLICATION OF THE BALANCING TESTS ONCE A CONSTITUTIONAL
VIOLATION HAS BEEN DETERMINED

i Was the constitutional violation excusable? Questions of 'good faith ' and

lack of intentionality

160 See Duff, supra note 149 at 155, providing examples of this sort
161 Ridgeway v the Q!,teen, [1995] HCA 66, 184 CLR 19 at 38, cited to CLR in Craig M
Bradley, 'Mapp Goes Abroad' (2001) 52 Case Western Reserve Law Review 375 at 380
[Bradley, 'Mapp'].
162 Leon, supra note 26 at 907-8.
163 Murray, supra note 25 at 537.
164 Herring v United States, 129 S Ct 695 at 697 (2009) [Herring].
165 Ibid at 700.
166 Hudson, supra note 33 at 591.
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Once the German courts determine that the interest violated is of constitutional magnitude, they next examine the gravity of the violation; that is,
whether it was in conscious disregard of the law or only inadvertent or
negligent. 167 A similar test has been adopted by the Australian High
Court, whereby the Court should take into consideration whether or
not there was bad faith on the part of the police and also how easy it
would have been to comply with the law. 168 The Scottish courts also
occasionally refer to whether there was bad faith on the part of the
police in deciding whether to exclude. 169 CCP-Netherlands gives the
court discretion to exclude evidence and obligates it to 'take account
of the interest that the breached rule serves, the gravity of the breach
and the harm it causes.'' 7"
In 1998, the Spanish Constitutional Court admitted a 'good faith'
exception to the otherwise categorical exclusionary rule codified in
lDPJ-Spain article 11.1.' 7 ' It made the nice distinction between 'natural'
and juridical' causation. The Court analysed the extent to which an
illegal wiretap tainted the other evidence in terms of the right to a 'fair
trial;' referring directly to the approach taken by the ECtHR in this
respect.' 72 It analysed whether the violation was of a required 'intensity'
and then used a balancing test to determine whether there was an 'anti-juridical' nexus between illegality and the derivative evidence. It determined
that the violation was not so 'intense' due to the fact that the police did get
a wiretap order and the violation was based on a lack of probable cause.
The Court also noted that such an 'error' was not intentional and not
grossly negligent, and that under the totality of the circumstances, the
derivative evidence could be used. 173 Here we see an incorporation of
the 'good faith' rule articulated in Leon in relation to wiretaps, a step
even the USSC has not yet taken.
In Leon, the USSC introduced the 'good faith' exception to the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule in a case in which a magistrate erroneously
issued a search warrant based on what a police officer believed in 'good
faith' constituted probable cause. The USSC held that, though the Fourth
Amendment was violated, excluding the illegally obtained evidence
would only be appropriate to deter unlawful police conduct if the
167 Weigend, supra note 91 at 251.
168 Bunning v Cross, (1978) 141 CLR 54, cited in Bradley, 'Mapp,' supra note 161 at 380
[Bunning].

169 See Edgley v Rarbtmr, 1994 SCCR 789 at 792 (HCJ Scot), cited in Duff, supra note 149 at
165.
170 Netherlands-CCP, supra note 41, S 359a(l).
171 STC 81/1998 (4 February 1998), online: <http://www.boe.es/aeboejconsultas/
bases_ datos/ doc.php?coleccion=tc&id=SENTENCIA-1 998-0081 > [STC 81 /1998]
172 See Part IV-B below.
173 STC 81/1998, supra note 171.
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officer intentionally or recklessly submitted a clearly inadequate or 'bare
bones' affidavit of probable cause or false evidence to the magistrate.' 74
The USSC has also extended the 'good faith' exception to other areas
where the magistrate erred, such as where the search warrant itself contained an erroneous or inadequate description of the things to be
seized or the places to be searched 175 or where an unlawful detention
was based on erroneous court records. 176 Finally, however, the Court has
lowered the bar recently to allow admission of evidence which was gathered when the police were guilty of 'isolated negligence' in believing
there was probable cause. 177
Since the assessment of probable cause - that is, a 'fair probability' that
a crime has been committed or that evidence of that crime is to be found
in a particular place - is a value judgment based on the 'totality of the circumstances,' I believe that a narrow exception can be allowed in borderline
cases where 'reasonable minds may differ on the question whether a particular affidavit establishes probable cause,' 178 when the officer has followed
the search warrant procedure and submitted the case to an impartial
magistrate. I also believe that 'good faith' could save evidence derived
from police procedures which were allowed by law or high-court jurisprudence when they were performed but where the standards became stricter
after the measure was undertaken.' 79 I believe the exception for police negligence is, however, going too far. I agree with Justice Ginsburg's dissent in
Herring that tort liability for negligence is considered to deter careless
conduct in citizens, and if the Fourth Amendment exclusionary is meant
to deter, it should encompass negligent conduct as well. 180

ii Was the evidence the 'fruit' of the constitutional violation?
a Introduction
Even if a system recognizes the extension of the exclusionary rule to
derivative evidence, the question still remains as to whether the evidence
to be admitted really owes its existence to the constitutional violation; that
174 Leon, supra note 26 at 915-2~.
175 Massachusetts v Shepard, 468 US 981 at 988-90 ( 1984), decided on the same day as Leon,
supra note 26.
176 Arizona v Evans, 514 US 1 at 14-5 (1995).
177 Herring, supra note 164 at 702.
178 Leon, supra note 26 at 914.
179 For instance, the USSC recently limited the scope of a search incident to an anest of a
vehicle; see Arizona v Cant, 129 S Ct 1710 (2009). Several courts have refused to
suppress evidence gathered in searches which abided by the earlier rule but violated
the new Cant strictures; see State v Baker, 229 P (3d) 650 at 668 (Utah 2010); State v
Danie~ 242 P (3d) 1186 at 1195 (Kan 2010); United States v Davi~, .~98 F (3d) 1259 at
1267 (11th Cir 2010); United States v Buford, 632 F (3d) 264 at 276-7 (6th Cir 2011).
180 HPrring, supra note 164 at 708 (Ginsburg, dissenting).
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is, is actually its 'fruit.' And it is here that the famous exception of 'attenuated taint' and its closely related subcategories 'inevitable discovery' or
'independent source' are invoked to admit arguably derivative evidence.
Each of these exceptions has been recognized and applied by the
Spanish courts, despite Spain's categorical exclusionary rule in relation
to derivative evidence. 181 Since the aforementioned Constitutional Court
decision in 1998, Spain's courts now engage in a balancing test to determine whether to exclude the fruits of a constitutional violation and the
test is framed in terms of a limitation on the doctrine of the 'fruits of
the poisonous tree.' An exception to the otherwise categorical nde can
exist 'even when there is a factual causal nexus between the illegality
and the evidence, if the causal link is not based in the illegality' (is not
'antijuridical'). In assessing the existence of a legally relevant connection, the following elements should be taken into account: (a) what the
significance was of the constitutional infringement; (b) what importance
the evidence had for proving guilt; (c) whether there was a hypothetical
clean path to discover the evidence (i.e., inevitable discovery); (d)
whether the right violated requires special protection; and (e) whether
the violating officers acted intentionally or erred in good faith and thus
whether exclusion is necessary for deterrent purposes. 182
I will now discuss how courts approach the issue of 'fruits' in deciding
whether to suppress fruit-; of both privacy violations and unconstitutional
confessions.
b Fruits of illegal dwelling searches
( 1) Independent source and inevitable discovery
The courts will generally allow evidence that has been discovered through
an illegal 'search' if it is actually 'seized' by independent legal means. 183
The courts will also admit evidence which is seized illegally if it would
inevitably have been discovered through legal means. 184 The doctrine of
181 See the decision of the Spanish Supreme Court in STS (5June 1995) RJ No 4538,6058
at 6060; for English translation, see Thaman, Criminal Procedure, supra note 37 at 118-9.
182 STS 9/2004 (19 January 2004), online: <http://sentenciasjuridicas.com/index.
php >.
183 The doctrine of 'independent source' is applied in cases where there have been two
searches, an illegal one and a legal one, independent of the illegality. It is applied,
for instance, when police discover the presence of evidence illegally but actually
seize it pursuant to a search warrant based on information they possessed before the
illegal search; see Seg:ura v United States, 468 US 796 at 805 (1984); Murray, supra note
25 at 537.
184 This doctrine of 'inevitable discovery' is applied where there is only one search and
seizure but other investigative procedures independent of the illegality would have
discovered the evidence legally. Williams, supra note 24 at 444. The Germans call this
the 'hypothetical independent source' or 'hypothetical clean path'; Weigend, supra
note 91 at 253.
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'inevitable discovery,' however, can serve as a gaping loophole in constitutional protections if interpreted in too broad a manner. Some
American courts have recognized this exception if the police, who had
probable cause, were already in the process of getting a search warrant
when they erroneously but in good faith felt that exigent circumstances
existed which allowed them to make a warrantless entry. 185 However, the
most dangerous extension of this notion of a 'hypothetical independent
source' is when the court allows the introduction of evidence because
probable cause existed and a judge would have approved a warrant application had it been submitted. 186 The German Courts have routinely used
this latter rationale and almost never exclude the direct fruits of warrantless searches.'"'
(2) The seizure is not a fruit of the unlawful search
In overseas jurisprudence one finds doctrines which sever the causal connection between a constitutional illegality and its 'fruits' in ways unknown
in the United States. One of these is the notion that seizures are conceptually independent of searches and that if the seizure is 'legal' then the
nexus of illegality hao; been attenuated. Another is that a seizure that is
a causal result of an illegal search can, nevertheless, be attenuated by judicial balancing of other factors.
It is a doctrine firmly entrenched in Italy and accepted by courts in
Germany that the seizure of drugs, for instance, is not the fruit of a
clearly unconstitutional search, even where the express object of the
search was to find those self-same drugs. The Italian courts reason that,
since CPP-Italy section 253(1) requires the police to seize the corpus
delicti of a crime (that is, fruits, instrumentalities, and contraband),
then this legal seizure cannot be vitiated by an antecedent unconstitutional search, be it without probable cause or judicial authorization.'""
The courts have held that searches and seizures have different juridical
185 United States v Cabassa, 62 F (3d) 470 at 473 (2d Cir 1995); United States v Whitehorn, 829
F (2d) 1225 at 1232-3 (2d Cir 1987), with respect to a search warrant signed after the
search; United States v Curtis, 931 F (2d) 1011 at 1013 (4th Cir 1991).
186 The overwhelming majority of US courts have rejected this argument, for it would
make the warrant requirement meaningless. United States v johnson, 22 F (3d) 674 at
680 (6th Cir 1994); United States v Echegoyen, 799 F (2d) 1271 at 1279 (9th Cir 1986);
State v Handtmann, 437 NW 2d 830 at 838 (ND 1989); United States v Brawn, 64 F
(3d) 1083 at 1085 (7th Cir 1995).
187 See Ransiek, supra note 95 at 566. In 1989, the German Supreme Court held that the
evidence found in an unconstitutional search will be admissible as long as it is
otherwise legally seizable (i.e., is contraband, fruits, or instrumentalities of crime)
and a judge would have issued a search warrant had the police sought one; see
Weigend, supra note 91 at 252.
188 Italian Supreme Court (27 March 1996) Giust Penale 138, 140, 144-5 (1997); for
English translation, see Thaman, Criminal Procedure, supra note 37 at 122-4.
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presuppositions and functions and cannot be viewed as linked due to
their convergence in reality. 189 As was noted in Section III above, the doctrine of 'fruits of the poisonous tree' applies only to 'nullities' when
expressly provided by statute and not to the general exclusionary rule
in CCP-Italy section 191.'"0 This doctrine is baffling, because the Italian
literature, like the Spanish, asserts that 'nullities' relate only to nonconstitutional violations in the gathering of evidence, whereas 'nonusability' applies only to violations of fundamental rights. 191
By separating an unlawful search, which is a tool to find evidence to
use in a criminal case, from its object, the evidence sought, the Italian
and German courts ignore the plain meaning of their constitutional
prohibitions on unwarranted searches in order to achieve a goal, the
conviction of a guilty person at any cost, which is no longer the purported
goal of criminal procedure. It is clear that the prohibition .of the
violation of privacy of the dwelling is not only rooted in the protection
of privacy, but also constitutes a limitation on the ability of the state to
gather information or seize evidence in those spaces. Search and
seizure cannot be logically separated into different actions with different
motivations. 192
c Fruits of unconstitutional interceptions of confidential conversations
Unlike in America, where the fruits of a violation of the wiretap statute
are explicitly inadmissible, the approach in Europe is less rigorous. In
Germany, for instance, the testimony of witnesses who were discovered
through an illegal interception has been admitted at trial.'"' Although
CCP-Italy section 271 ( 1) mandates 'non-usability' of illegally intercepted
conversations, CCP-Italy section 271 (3) makes an exception for physical
fruits which can prove cmpus delicti. There is also no restriction on
using the contents of 'non-usable' conversations to further the investigation, discover new crimes, and so on.' 94 New wiretaps may also be
based on the information gained from antecedent illegal ones.'"'

189 Italian Supreme Court (24 April1991) Decision No; cited in Conso & Grevi, supra note
43 at 550.
190 See Decision No 332/2001, supra note 43; cj Conso & Grevi, supra note 43 at 339.
191 Giuseppe Luigi Fanuli, Inutilizzabilita e nullita della pwva nel giudizio ablmroiato, net
'jJatteggiamento' e nell'istituto della acquisizione degli atti su accordo delle parti (Milan:
Giuffre, 2004) at 5-6.
192 Ransiek, supra note 95 at 568. At least one section of the Italian Supreme Court has
rejected the prevailing doctrine and recognizes a strict functional relationship
between the act of searching and the seizure. Italian Supreme Court (13 March
1992) Decision No; cited in Conso & Grevi, supra note 43 at 550.
193 See Weigend, supra nole 91 al 253.
194 Franco Cordero, Procedura penale, 5th ed (Milan: Giuffre, 2000) at 804.
195 Conso & Grevi, supra note 43 at 399.
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Until the advent of the new approach of the Spanish Constitutional
Court in 1998, 196 physical evidence found as a result of an unconstitutional wiretap or bugging was routinely suppressed in accordance with
LOPJ-Spain section 11.1 and could not be used at trial. 197 For example,
in one case police used a scanner to intercept cell-phone conversations
without having obtained judicial authorization. The information gathered led to an arrest and the search incident thereto uncovered drugs.
The Supreme Court held that the drugs were fruit of the poisonous
tree and could not be used. 19s Since the advent of the new case law,
however, the decision has depended on the new balancing test mentioned above. 199 In the seminal 1998 case, the Spanish Constitutional
Court used the doctrine of inevitable discovery to dissociate the arrest
of the defendant in possession of drugs from an unconstitutional
wiretap by arguing that the defendant had already been under heavy
police surveillance and the arrest was therefore not sufficiently tainted
by the antecedent illegality."""
d 'Fruits' of 'involuntary' confessions which may or may not be the
product of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment
I submit, based on the analysis in Part III-A above, that any fruits, even
physical evidence, of confessions induced by torture or cruel, inhuman,
or degrading treatment must be suppressed, provided that the taint has
not been attenuated. The USSC has also indicated that the 'fruits of
the poisonous tree' of 'involuntary' confessions which were not
induced by cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment would also not be
usable in a criminal trial. Thus, in Oregon v Elstad201 the Court held that
a voluntary confession following proper section 11.1 warnings 202 would
be subject to exclusion if it followed on the heels of a confession
deemed to be involuntary under the due process analysis. In Patane, 2"' a
plurality of the Court also said that physical evidence would be subject
to exclusion if found as a result of a 'coerced' confession. Because the
USSC based its reluctance to apply the 'fruits of the poisonous tree' doctrine to Miranda violations on their supposed sub-constitutional,
196 STC 81/1998, supra note 171.
197 See Juan-Luis Gomez Colomer, 'La intervenci6n judicial de las comunicaciones
telef6nicas a Ia luz de lajurispmdencia' (1998) 97 Revistajuridica de Catalunya 145
at 162-6.
198 STS 137/1999 (8 Febmary 1999), online: <http://sentenciasJuridicas.com/index.
php >.
199 See text accompanying note 173 supra.
200 Sec STC 81/1998, supra note 171.
201 470 US 298 at 340 (1985).
202 On section 11.1 warnings, see Miranda, supra note 22.
203 Supr<t note 64 at 632.
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'prophylactic' character, it would follow, therefore, that a clear constitutional violation of due process resulting in an involuntary confession
would necessarily require exclusion of the 'fruits,' whether they be in
the form of subsequent confessions or physical evidence. 204 In addition,
no evidence derived in any way from a statement compelled through a
grant of immunity may be admissible in a trial of the person who was
granted immunity. 205
In some jurisdictions, however, the fruits of involuntary statements may
be used. Although PACE section 76(2) (a) provides that a confession
'may' be rendered inadmissible 'where it is the product of "oppression,"'206 section 76( 4-6) of the same statute allows for the admission
in evidence of any facts or physical evidence which were found as a
result of the inadmissible confession. 207 Argentine courts have also
allowed the use of information from involuntary confessions to further
the investigation. 208
e Fruits of 'unknowing' confessions taken in violation of the right to
counsel or without admonitions as to the right to silence
Following the Patanedecision, 209 there is no bar in the US federal courts to
using physical evidence gathered as a result of a violation of the Miranda
rule. Many European countries take a similar approach. For instance, the
Italian courts do not recognize the doctrine of 'fruits of the poisonous
tree' for physical evidence or witnesses discovered through otherwise
unlawful confessions. 210 In Germany, which has given Miranda warnings
constitutional status, the courts do not extend the evidentiary prohibition
to the 'fruits' of a confession taken without the proper warnings, whether
in the form of physical evidence or subsequent confessions. 211

204 Supporting this iiHerpretation, LaFave et al, supra note 53 at 543.
205 18 USC § 6002: 'The prosecution has a burden to prove the evidence it uses is derived
from a legitimate source wholly independent of the compelled testimony.' See also
Kastigar v United States, 406 US 441 at 460 (1972).
206 PACE, supra note 120.
207 Ibid. Compare ibid at para 76(5), which provides, nevertheless, that the jury shall not
be told that the 'facts' were derived from the statements of the defendant. Duff, supra
note 149 at 152, alleges that there are no English cases upholding the suppression of
physical evidence.
208 Alejandro D Carri6 & Alejandro M Garro, 'Argentina' in Craig M Bradley, ed, Criminal
Procedure: A Worldwide Study, 2d ed (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2007) 3 at
32-3.
209 Supra note 64.
210 Elizabeth MT Di Palma, 'Riflessioni sulla sfera di operativita della sanzione di cui
all'art. 191 cpp' in Vincenzo Perchinunno, ed, Percorsi di Procedura Penale. Dal
garantismo inquisitorio a un accusatorio non garantito (Milan: Giuffre, 1996) at 113 at 115.
211 Weigend, supra note 91 at 261.
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Some US state courts, however, have suppressed physical evidence
resulting from a Miranda violation, whether or not the violation was intentional or inadvertent. 212
In Canada, police are not constitutionally required to advise detained
suspects of the right to silence before questioning them, but section
lO(b) of the Charter does accord arrested persons the right to attempt
to contact counsel before being interrogated. 213 If the right to counsel
has been violated, however, and derivative evidence is found that could
not have been found but for the violation, the Canadian courts consider
this to be 'conscript.ed' evidence and have traditionally suppressed it.
Thus, if a suspect points out incriminating evidence in his own house,
which would have been searched anyway, this would be admissible; but
if the accused, while being denied the right to counsel, informs police
that the murder weapon is at the bottom of a frozen river, this must be
suppressed. 214 Whether the 'conscription' doctrine is still viable is questionable, since the Canadian Supreme Court recently adopted a new
approach to exclusion in two 2009 cases. 215
F BALANCING THE QUALITY OR IMPORTANCE OF THE EVIDENCE

i Introduction: Distinguishing among different kinds of evidence
Prior to 2002, in New Zealand there was a rebuttable presumption that
illegally gathered evidence was inadmissible. The New Zealand Court of
Appeal, however, adopted a new, multi-factor 'fairness' test in 2002
which gives the trial judge broad discretion in deciding whether to
exclude illegally gathered evidence and provides a list of criteria to be
weighed, including the 'seriousness of the offense' and the 'importance
of the evidence.'"'" A similar test was adopted by the Australian High
Court, which required trial courts to consider the question of whether
there was bad faith on the part of the police, the importance of the evidence, ~he seriousness of the offence, and the ease with which the law
might have been complied with."' 7

212 Commonwealth v Martin, 827 NE (2d) 198 at 215 (Mass 2005); State v Knapp, 700 NW
(2d) 899 at 905-6 (Wis 2005); State v Peterson, 923 A (2d) 585 at 588-91 (Vt 2007);
State v Vondehn, 236 P (3d) 691 at 695 (Or 2010).
213 Roach, supra note 156 at 75-7.
214 Ibid at 71.
215 See Grant, supra note 157 at para 16, where the court balanced a non-egregious
unlawful detention and questioning by virtue of which the defendant was
'conscripted' to admit possession of a gun against the importance of the rights
impinged on thereby and the importance of the physical evidence to determine the
tmth of the charges and admitted the gun.
216 R v Shaheed, [2002) 2 NZLR 377 (CA); cited in Mahoney, supra note 151 at 607.
217 Bunning, supra note 168 at 380.
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The right to privacy in Germany and some other countries is
grounded in the right to human dignity and most importantly the
'right to develop one's personality.' 218 This approach has led to declaring
certain items non-seizable, even where the government has probable
cause that they would be material to prove guilt in a criminal case. In
Germany, for instance, this protection extends to personal diaries 219 and
to a person's spoken words when surreptitiously recorded by another,
whether the recorder is or is not a state official. 220
This doctrine is reminiscent of the old 'mere evidence' doctrine of the
USSC which was overruled in 1967. 221 According to that doctrine, the government only had a right to seize the corp1!S delicti of crime; that is, objects
to which it had a superior title, such as fruits and instruments of crime,
and contraband. Personal papers were protected unless they were instruments of crime. 222 In fact, to search for and seize a person's words, even
where put to paper or uttered under no compulsion, was considered to
be tantamount to compelling self-incrimination. As the Boyd court
noted, '[W]e have been unable to perceive that the seizure of a man's
private books and papers to be used in evidence against him is substantially different from compelling him to be a witness against himself. ' 223
The now overruled 'mere evidence' rule and the current German
limitations on using highly personal evidence to prove guilt are examples,
not merely of prohibitions on 'use' due to the irregular or illegal methods
of seizure/24 but of prima facie intrinsic prohibitions on the seizure of what
may be highly probative evidence.
ii F:vidence of questionable reliability
Coerced or otherwise involuntary confessions were traditionally excluded
in the United States due to their lack of credibility rather than on constitutional grounds. 225 Today, even potentially probative evidence may be
218 Consl-Germany, sup1a note 92, art 2(1)
219 See Decision of German Supreme Court of 21 February 1964, 19 BGHSt 325 at 326-8
(1964); for English translation, see Thaman, Criminal Procedure, supra note 37 at 82.
220 See Decision of German Supreme Court of 14June 1960, 14 BGHSt 358 at 359-60,
364-5 (1960); for English translation, see Thaman, Criminal Procedure, supra note 37
at 72-3.
221 Warden, supra note 100 at 309-10.
222 Bayd v United States, 116 US 616 at 628 (1886); rn;eks, supra note 14 at 391-2.
223 Bayd, ibid at 633. Note the similarity with the now out-dated Canadian exclusionary rule
based on constitutional violations which 'conscript' the defendant to give evidence
against himself. For a similar comparison of a subpoena duces tecum with an
involuntary confession, see Beling, supra note 28 at 14.
224 On the distinction between Beweiserhebungsverbot (evidentiary gathering prohibition)
and Beweisverwertungsverbot (evidentiary use prohibition), see ClatL~ Roxin,
Strafuerfahrensrecht: ein Studienbuch, 24th ed (Munich: Beck, 1995) at 164.
225 Hopt v Territory of Utah, 110 US 574 at 585 (1884).
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excluded if the judge decides that its prejudicial nature outweighs it<> probative value. 22"
A number of post-Soviet codes have exclusionary rules which limit
exclusion to situations where the violation 'influenced or could have
influenced the credibility of the evidence. ' 227 Such emphasis on the credibility of the evidence also constitutes one prong of the tests which have
been adopted by the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR) and for the International
Criminal Court (ICC). Rule 95 of the IC1Y Rules of Procedure and
Evidence provides: 'No evidence shall be admissible if obtained by
methods which cast substantial doubt on it<> reliability or if its admission
is antithetical to, and would seriously damage, the integrity of the proceedings.'228 Identical language was incorporated into section 69(7) of
the Rnme Statute for the International Criminal Court! 29
Exclusionary rules based on the questionable reliability of evidence
are unremarkable, for courts should generally only admit reliable and relevant evidence or, at the least, should prevent judges from relying on
questionable evidence when formulating the reasons for their decisions.
iii Physical evidence that proves corpus delicti
We have discussed how, in Italy the police duty to seize contraband, fruits,
and instrumentalities of crime - that is, the corpus delicti - breaks the
nexus between a patently unconstitutional search and its intended
fruits and allows the use of the evidence collected!'" The other side of
this equation is that 'mere evidence' discovered in a patently illegal
search would be 'non-usable,' much as it was under Boyd even following
a warranted search based on probable cause.
The unwillingness of most courts to suppress physical evidence which
is a fruit of a violation of the right to privacy or the Miranda rules and of
some to do so when the evidence is the fruit of an unconstitutional
wiretap or an involuntary confession speaks to the preponderance of
truth-finding over constitutional rights, at least when dealing with the
226 Fed R Evid 403; Cal Evidence Code § 352.
227 CCP-Armenia at para 105 (footnote info needed on three of these). Similar language is
used in CCP-Azerbaijan § 125(2) (l); CCP-Moldova § 94(2); and CCP-Turkmenistan §
125.
228 UN, International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the
Former Yugoslavia since 1991, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, UN Doc IT/32/Rev 40
(2007). See also International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Rules of Procedure and
Evidence, adopted 5 July 1996, online: <http://wWw.unictr.org/Portals/O/
English %5CLegal%5CEvidance%5CEnglish %5C050796e.pdf > .
229 The Rome Statute of the lnlemaiional Criminal Court, UNGAOR, 53d Sess, UN Doc A/
CONF183/9 (1998).
230 See text accompanying note 188 supra.
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most reliable of evidence. This balancing is justified by some courts with
the assertion that the admission of physical evidence can never violate the
right to a fair trial because it is not really the 'fruit' of the violation, nor
dependent thereon, having pre-existed the violation. 231
G THE GRAVITY OF THE CRIME WHICH IS BEING PROSECUTED

Beling's treatise on evidentiary prohibitions clearly provided for more
liberal admissibility of illegally seized evidence in capital cases than in
less serious ones: '[T] he interest in solving high treason or a murder is
infinitely greater than the interest in investigating and punishing a
cyclist who drives on the wrong side of the road, or a sassy young man
who gives his desire for singing too long a rein during night time
hours.' 232 Beling's approach has now been squarely adopted by the
German courts. Thus, even if a court is dealing with a grave violation
of the right to develop one's personality which would normally lead to
exclusion of a diary, for instance, the court must still weigh the seriousness of the crime charged before deciding whether to exclude. 233
Andrew Ashworth has, in my view correctly, asserted that the seriousness of the charges facing the defendant should never go into the balancing process because the more serious the charge, the more detrimental
will be the introduction of the evidence to the defendant due to the more
severe punishment awaiting him. 2" A compromise position here would be
to mandate a reduction of punishment if the state violated the constitution in order to bring someone to justice. 235
In another context, I have suggested that all interrogations should take
place only after counsel has been provided and that confessions should
be negotiated, much like plea-bargains: the defendant could agree to
help the state in proving guilt but only after having negotiated a discounted punishment. The truth might better be ascertained through a
grant of leniency than through the typical psychological coercion of custodial interrogation. 236 Criminal codes could also provide statutory
231 This rationalization is employed in South Mrica; sec Schwikkard & van der Merwe,
supra note 155 at 488.
232 Beling, supra note 28 at 35.
233 The German Supreme Court allowed use of a dia1y in a brutal rape-murder case but
not in a peijury case; Thaman, Criminall'rocedure, supra note 37 at 113.
234 Ashworth, supra note 148 at 732 [cited in Duff]; discussed in Duff, supra note 149 at
169-71.
235 This is allowed under CCP-Netherlands, supra note 44, § 359a and is suggested by some
US commentators; see Guido Calabresi, 'The Exclusionary Rule' (2003) 26 Harv JL &
Pub Pol 'y 111 at 116.
236 Stephen C Thaman, 'Gerechtigkeit und Verfahrensvielfalt: Logik der beschleunigten,
konsuellen und vereinfachten Strafprozessmodelle' in Stefan Machura & Stefan
lJJbrich, eds, Recht-GeJellschafl-Kornmunikation: Festschrift fur Klaus F !Whl (Baden
Baden, Germany: Nomos, 2003) 314.
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mitigation whenever -the use of unconstitutionally acquired evidence is
required to prove guilt. In other words, the maximum punishment
should only be allowable if the state can prove guilt without any help
from the defendant, whether obtained voluntarily or involuntarily.
H APPROPRIATE BALANCING

The balancing doctrines discussed in this part of the paper are applied to
illegal evidence gathering of all kinds. As argued above, they should not
be applied where the illegality in question involves a violation of fundamental constitutional rights. Nonetheless, these doctrines are useful in
considering appropriate balancing in cases where an illegality of lesser
significance has occurred. In such cases, factors relevant to the seriousness of the violation (e.g., good or bad faith) can be balanced against
factors relevant to the effect of the evidence on the· trial (e.g., trial fairness, reliability). However, for the reasons given by Ashworth, the seriousness of the offence should not be a factor.
VI Conclus~on

Only a few jurisdictions, notably those which have recently emerged from
under totalitarian or authoritarian regimes (former Soviet and Yugoslav
republics, Turkey, Latin American countries) have foreclosed all balancing in relation to the use of any evidence which was gathered illegally,
whether or not the illegality was of constitutional proportions.
Otherwise, the international community has clearly prohibited any balancing in relation to statements obtained through torture, or cruel,
inhuman, and degrading treatment and appears to be moving in that
direction in relation to statements given either involuntarily or in the
absence of counsel. Although most countries will suppress confidential
communications that were obtained in violation of wiretap legislation, a
blanket exclusionary rule which includes fruits, such as exists in the US
legislation, is not yet a commonplace in relation to either illegal wiretaps
or involuntary or counsel-less statements.
Once a country advances from a police state to an entrenched democratic society, should we allow more balancing (i.e., tolerate more police
lawlessness) or less? Should we extend categorical exclusion, including
that of 'fruits,' to privacy and Mimnda violations or even admit of balancing in relation to what are considered to be more serious violations? The
categorical exclusionary rule of LOPJ-5pain section 11.1 was arguably still
a reaction to the abuses of the Francoist police but has now given way to a
balancing test. In the United States, the harsh language of lteeks condemning widespread police violation of rights led to seemingly categorical exclusionary rules in Mapp and Mimnda, but the recent cases, which
propose doing more balancing, seem to intimate that our police have
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now developed to such an extent that the old toughness is no longer
required. 237 But if police have become more professional, shouldn't
they be aware of constitutional rules and follow them? Or do our
modern constitutional rules prevent police from solving crimes or
make it too time consuming?
Once such a violation of constitutional importance has been ascertained, there should be a presumption that any evidence directly or
indirectly gathered as a result of the violation should be excluded.
Valid exceptions, such as for good faith mistakes or emergency situations,
should be narrowly construed in the way I have argued above. 'Fruits of
the poisonous tree,' even physical evidence, should be excluded when
the taint of the violation has not been attenuated, there is no true independent source, and the evidence would not inevitably have been
discovered.
The seriousness of the crime under investigation should play a role in
the assessment of whether emergency or exigent circumstances will
obviate the necessity to secure a warrant or administer Miranda warnings
but should not be an omnibus reason to admit evidence where there has
been a clear and unforgiveable constitutional violation. The area of 'good
faith' of the violating official should be limited to cases where the officer
was using what were formerly accepted practices at the time of the investigative measure that were subsequently deemed to violate constitutional
principles, or where a search warrant was obtained based on evidence
which was close to being 'probable cause.' A police officer who acts negligently is not acting in 'good faith,' especially in a case like Herring, where
police were negligent in looking for a pretext to arrest someone as to
whom they had no reasonable suspicion. 238
Finally, the importance of the evidence to convict the defendant
should never be a factor. The ECtHR has consistently ruled that the
use of evidence gathered in violation of the defendant's right to confront
her accusers, which is protected by ECHR article 6 (e) (d), will violate the
'fair trial' right of ECHR article 6 if it is the main evidence of guilt but not
necessarily if it is only used to corroborate other substantial evidence of
guilt. 239 The ECtHR has taken this approach in relation to the violation
of the right to counsel in Salduz and I believe they should extend it to violations of the right to privacy as well.
The area where true judicial balancing should have free rein, is where.
the violation is truly not of constitutional significance, such as errors in
237 See for instance Hudson, supra note 33 at 598-9.
238 Herring, supra note 164 at 698, noting that the reason for stopping the defendant was
that he Wds 'no stranger to law enforcement.'
239 See discussion of ECtHR case law in Thaman, Criminal Procedure, supra note 37 at
129-35.
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the execution of a search or wiretap warrant otherwise based on probable
cause. Here, the seriousness of the violation can be weighed against the
seriousness of the offence, the intentionality of the violations, and so on.
When balancing is allowed, it should also not be undertaken by the
trial judge, especially in those systems based in the civil law, where the
trial judge is considered to be an investigator of the material truth of
the charges. A judge with such inquisitorial duties will intentionally or
instinctively give priority to the principle of material truth in exercising
the Herculean balancing act and neglect the equally important role as
constitutional guarantor. Therefore, if judicial balancing is to persist, it
should be carried out by a neutral judge of the investigation, or liberty
judge, and not the trial judge or investigating magistrate, who is also
duty-bound to seek truth.

